Amid the cobbled walls and wildflowers in springtime Ghent, another movement bloomed. The conference, titled “Beyond Borders: Youth Resilience Against the CCP,” brought together rising young activists to enhance their skills and cross-community connections in combating the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s transnational repression. From Tibetan, Taiwanese, Hong Konger, Uyghur, and Southern Mongolian backgrounds, the activists represented the communities most central in this fight.

Through its wide range of workshops, the conference uniquely blended all aspects of peaceful resistance. In the first session, titled “AI as a Tool,” Athena Tong, a research associate at the China Strategic Risks Institute, described AI’s opportunities and risks for activists alongside examples of its use. This focus on how activists can leverage open-source techniques and their comparative digital freedom was an inspiring and urgent perspective amid usual one-sided focus on the CCP’s deployment of AI.

One particular example that Athena gave was how activists used AI to capitalize upon rare leaks like the GoLaxy papers, which revealed the CCP’s development of AI propaganda personas, to profile the developers behind them. Another is MonlamAI, a large language model and translation tool developed by Tibetan computer scientists in exile to counteract censorship and Sinicization of online Tibetan content. As she remarked, “AI tools run both ways. Activists are increasingly realizing this.” Following HRF’s AI Hack for Freedom in January, which connected human rights defenders with open-source AI developers, the opportunities for activists to create digital tools to power their work with the help of AI have never been greater.

The Digital Protection workshop led by cybersecurity expert Sarah Moulton expanded upon this practical element. Through an interactive simulation where guests acted as members of an NGO facing cyberattacks, she illustrated how software vulnerabilities form a critical bottleneck to operations and can exponentially drain resources if left unchecked. By encouraging guests to reflect upon instances where their own organizations have faced such cyberattacks, Sarah’s workshop valuably grounded theory within specific examples.

The Legal Pathways workshop complemented the previous two by refining participants’ understanding of their legal entitlements to protection from common techniques of transnational repression, such as extradition and harassment by plainclothes Chinese agents. With her extensive expertise in advocating for targeted dissidents as Safeguard Defenders’ China in the World director and external liaison for the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, Laura Harth illuminated the legal mechanisms behind notable case studies.

Among these, analysis of both the CCP’s extradition treaties with other nations and its increasing use of bogus charges of economic crimes — such as in the sentencing of the father of Hong Kong activist Anna Kwok in February — was particularly useful for the exiled Chinese activists in attendance.

Participants also shared their own tips about legal advocacy. Misran Dolan, the president of the Uyghur American Association, noted the benefits of building long-term relationships with congressional staffers. “In most cases, senators will be voted out or representatives will leave Capitol Hill, but staffers will remain and might even open up new points of contact.”

This pragmatism was echoed by Freddy Lim, the lead vocalist of the Taiwanese heavy-metal band CHTHONIC, a two-term member of Taiwan’s legislature, and Taiwan’s current ambassador to Finland. During the Artistic Resistance workshop, his honesty about balancing his political, personal, and artistic lives struck chords touched upon during the workshop’s screening of “State of Statelessness,” an anthology of short films exploring Tibetans’ fight to maintain their identities and family ties across borders and nationalities. I moderated a panel discussion featuring three other Tibetan, Uyghur, and Southern Mongolian panelists who discussed how these themes resonated across their own diasporas.

Sonya Imin, a Uyghur-American filmmaker and academic on the panel, unpicked the thorny questions of complicity and estrangement facing Uyghurs able to return to occupied East Turkestan, alongside their relative privilege over those who cannot. Rei Xia, a Han dissident and Chinese activist who fled to Europe from Shanghai after being imprisoned for her role in the 2022 White Paper protests, expanded on the film’s nostalgia. For her, the forests of northern India evoked longing for her own grandparents’ rural village to which she may never return.

The experiences of Rei and other brave Han dissidents are often obscured by those of ethnic minorities. Yet, it takes perhaps the most bravery to sacrifice one’s own Han privilege to speak out against others’ oppression. Rei’s own political awakening in Shanghai’s clandestine and persecuted queer activism networks was an important reminder that in her own words, “in China, the patriarchy and the government are intertwined into a new form.”

Across the conference’s various academic and practical threads, collective care was proven to be activists’ most effective weapon. This was particularly acute during the Physical Protection workshop led by Pema Doma, former Executive Director of Students For a Free Tibet, who trained participants in collaborative self-defense. While fun and interactive, the session was a sobering reminder of the violence that activists perpetually face from CCP plainclothes agents and counterprotestors. Similarly, the Psychological Resilience workshop led by clinical psychologist Vanina Waizmann taught communal methods to manage the constant risks of burnout.

The Beyond Borders conference achieved its purpose in transcending not just imposed territorial borders, but the intangible borders dividing different peoples fighting the same transnational repression. Through its intimate conversations and expert workshops, guests found new empathy and knowledge in each other. Perhaps best symbolizing this was the Graffiti workshop, which saw different activists from many groups blend their political slogans and imagery into bold new wholes. In this spirit, we realized the promise of united youth resistance to the CCP’s repression, where each of us contributes our unique skills to the struggle we all share.

Photo by Evgeniy Alyoshin on Unsplash

As silver prices steadily rebound after falling by up to 27% on January 30^th, silver bulls are increasingly optimistic about surging industrial demand amid lasting supply constraints. They are correct about constrained supply, but the demand-side narrative requires qualification. Industrial demand is often attributed to AI infrastructure but the solar panel industry is the largest source. Demand from photovoltaic installations has outpaced other sectors, now accounting for 29% of overall silver demand compared to 11% in 2014[1].

However, while the capital expenditure of giants like Nvidia, who consistently reports mid-70% gross profit margins[2], can absorb pricier silver, photovoltaic manufacturers operate at far slimmer margins of around 15%[3]. With silver already constituting 30% of production costs[4], its rally may prove self-limiting as manufacturers seek to engineer their way out of it.

Silver is already the most conductive metal, and optimising its usage is nearing physical limits. The gridlines of silver “fingers” screen-printed on silicon wafers either side of photovoltaic cells are already ~80µm thin. Further thinning them impedes their ability to conduct electrons released by light striking the wafers. Risks of broken fingers or non-uniform heights also significantly increase when screen-printing at such high resolutions[5], while recycling silver also remains highly cost-intensive[6].

Faced with these engineering constraints, manufacturers may have found a copper bullet. Copper currently trades at 0.5% the price of silver by weight[7], and laboratory experiments have found that copper-silver blends can reduce silver paste usage by up to 70% while preserving efficiency[8]. Chinese manufacturers lead this pivot. Giants like Longi Solar[9], China’s second-largest manufacturer by market share, are aggressively building out production lines for copper-based metallisation.

Moreover, the very photovoltaic technologies that utilise copper are jostling with traditional silver-reliant ones. Copper metallisation is easiest to implement in back-contact cells, where all electrical contacts are on the cell’s rear and circumvent the difficulties of extremely fine screen-printing to minimise shade. Longi’s recent field data[10] found that back-contact cells achieved 4.5% cheaper energy costs compared to TOPCon cells that dominate market share and rely on silver contacts on the cell’s front face. While currently more expensive to produce, back-contact cells are forecasted to achieve cost-parity and equal market share with them by 2030[11].

It is not the first time that surging silver prices catalysed thrift. When its price doubled between 2009 and 2011[12], manufacturers reduced consumption by a third the following year[13]. It has decreased by 15% every year since[14]. Some industry experts forecast that if copper metallisation captures 50% of global photovoltaic production by 2030, solar silver consumption could halve[15]. Given its current 29% share of overall silver demand, this would be a very significant demand shock.

Retail investors appear undaunted, pouring almost half a billion dollars into SLV (the biggest silver exchange traded fund) in the week following January’s crash[16]. As they argue, supply is structurally inelastic since roughly 75% of silver is mined as a by-product of base metals. World-leading miners such as Glencore[17] and Fresnillo[18] have recently cut production forecasts by up to 10%, compounded by the long-term trend of declining ore quality across base metals[19].

Yet, these supply constraints are only half the equation. Industrial demand is proving itself highly inventive and elastic to commodity prices. The very speculative inflows driving silver prices may further compress R&D timelines to hasten innovation towards cheaper inputs. This dynamic has been visible in the solar market for over a decade. Even amid tight supply, it is one that could yet temper the metal’s ascent.

[1] https://silverinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Silver_The-Next-Generation-Metal_DECEMBER-Release.pdf

[2] https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/NVDA/nvidia/gross-margin

[3] https://docs.nrel.gov/docs/fy25osti/95135.pdf

[4] https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/solar-industry-accelerates-shift-silver-costs-soar-2026-02-19/

[5] https://www.pv-tech.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy-publication-pdfs/4251012258-cell-metallization-by-screen-printing-cost-limits-and-alternatives.pdf

[6] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0038092X24007229

[7]

https://www.copperprice.org/

[8] https://www.pv-magazine.com/2025/09/24/copper-metalized-heterojunction-solar-cells-close-to-achieve-same-efficiency-as-silver-based-counterparts/

[9] https://www.pv-magazine.com/2026/01/06/rising-silver-prices-drive-chinas-longi-shift-to-copper-metallized-solar-cells/

[10] https://eu.longi.com/press/longi-releases-global-bc-technology-field-data-performance-and-reliability-exceed-expectations

[11] https://www.pv-magazine.com/2025/12/08/back-contact-will-reach-cost-parity-with-topcon-before-end-of-decade/

[12] https://silverprice.org/silver-price-history.html

[13] https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/us/solar-industrys-silver-usage-drops-as-high-prices-burn-idUSL4N09D2BB/

[14] https://www.gurufocus.com/news/8607549/solar-hits-654-gw-as-silver-surges-154-on-demand-debate

[15] https://viox.com/solar-de-silvering-technology-trends/

[16] https://www.ft.com/content/3183551c-fd27-4469-8e1d-adac4ca7b5ca

[17] https://www.fastmarkets.com/insights/glencore-cuts-2026-copper-growth-forecast/

[18] https://www.wsj.com/business/fresnillo-cuts-silver-gold-production-guidance-after-output-falls-8f3dc3fa

[19] https://www.spglobal.com/market-intelligence/en/news-insights/research/2026/01/mine-cost-outlook-2026-inflation-new-supply-reshape-global-mining-landscape

Originally published with Collective Aid, here

Britain’s mooted and underreported plan to deport failed asylum seekers to North Macedonia was incoherent from the outset. Under the plans, Keir Starmer’s government would pay the Balkan nation of 1.8mn inhabitants an undisclosed sum for every person on the move they accepted. People on the move would be encouraged to apply for asylum in North Macedonia to plug labour shortages in critical industries like infrastructure but would not be detained or face restrictions on their movement, making them free to leave the country.

North Macedonia is a key point along the Balkan migration route which is the union of two migration flows: the Eastern Mediterranean route that leads from Türkiye by sea to Greece, and the Western Balkan route. In the latter, people on the move cross through the non-EU states of North Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Albania, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then through the EU member states of Romania, Hungary, or Croatia, until they reach western Europe. While traffic along the Western Balkan route has fallen sharply, declining by 46% over the first 10 months of 2025, it remains a critical entry point into Europe for tens of thousands of people.

There are several flaws with choosing North Macedonia specifically as a return hub. Of all the countries along the Balkan migration route, people on the move spend the lowest amount of time in it. A survey by the International Organisation for Migration of 2,680 people on the move transiting through the Balkan route from May 1st to July 31st 2025 found that people on the move on average only spend 4 days in North Macedonia before travelling to Serbia or Kosovo. By comparison, they spend 123 days in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Commensurately, North Macedonia has one of the lowest rates of asylum applications among Balkan route nations. Of the 4,055 people on the move that registered in its main transit centre in 2024, only 7.5% applied for asylum. That number was even less in 2025.

The 92.5% of people on the move who are intercepted but do not apply for asylum face severe threats from both the North Macedonian authorities and the smuggling gangs they rely on. Border Violence Monitoring Network and Collective Aid have spoken with multiple people on the move who have experienced “pushbacks” to Greece after being beaten by police and having their mobiles, SIM cards, and money confiscated. As defined by the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights, pushbacks “entail a variety of state measures aimed at forcing refugees and migrants out of their territory while obstructing access to applicable legal and procedural frameworks”.

Pushbacks occur within North Macedonia’s unique legal limbo. Its asylum applications and transit centres operate under conditions of lex specialis introduced during the 2015. Lex specialis is a legal principle whereby a specific law overrides a more general one if both are applicable. Once a person on the move declares an intention to request asylum, the Law on International and Temporary Protection which governs asylum applications and transit centres takes precedence over the Law on Foreigners.

By not allowing people on the move to declare asylum requests, North Macedonian border forces create a superficial legal justification for pushbacks under the Law on Foreigners which permits the deportation of foreign nationals who illegally enter or stay in the country. Even for the many people on the move who assent to be returned to Greece, they and NGOs working with them say their voluntary return is conducted orally and without any written documentation.

There are widespread reports of people on the move only being allowed to apply for asylum if they testify against their smugglers in illegal and undocumented hearings. Those who do testify face severe risks of retribution, exacerbated by their testimony being outside of any legal framework that could afford them witness protection. Besides this, people on the move face other abuses at the hands of border forces. In testimonies submitted to BVMN, one man recounted that North Macedonian police held a 16-year-old minor on train tracks in front of an approaching train until he confessed that there were two extra people in their group.

Others allege that authorities in return centres pressured them into confessing that they themselves were smugglers. Multiple intercepted people on the move have told Collective Aid that return centres lacked basic hygiene and medical facilities for those who sustained injuries either during their journey or at the hands of border authorities.

There is also a significant risk that Britain would be deporting failed asylum seekers into deeper exploitation by smuggler networks. Since North Macedonia is a transit country and facilitators are paid at each successful border crossing, they exert intense pressure on people on the move to voluntarily return to Greece and try again to enter North Macedonia. Some people on the move even leave the return centres during the night so that authorities do not know which point of the Greek border they will try to re-enter from. If somebody has tried crossing the border multiple times, smugglers also force them to act as a guide for other people on the move.

The Labour government’s plans are unlikely to come to fruition. Speaking at a Brussels conference to counter smuggling in December, North Macedonia’s Prime Minister denied that his government was ever in negotiations with Keir Starmer’s, calling such reports “baseless”.

It is not the first time that Starmer’s overseas deportations ambitions have been shot down. Albania’s Prime Minister denounced similar plans just days after Starmer claimed they were discussed during his visit to the country in May. Montenegro’s Prime Minister has said that it is not part of the Balkan migration route because its railway infrastructure is not developed enough. With unwitting irony, he would only consider its use as a return hub if Britain invested €10bn into its railway infrastructure — over double the cost of Britain’s asylum system in 2024/2025.

Given North Macedonia’s extremely low asylum applications and transition period for people on the move, paying it to receive failed asylum seekers would do little to deter migration flows through it. Since they can retry their journey from North Macedonia, it is further questionable whether deportation there is an effective deterrent for asylum seekers willing to use highly dangerous overland or overseas routes.

Most likely, British taxpayers would pay for North Macedonian authorities to continue conducting cruel and legally unsupported pushbacks that enrich smuggler networks and endanger lives.

Image from Farage’s YouTube upload of his economic speech.

The advantage of being a fringe party hellbent on immigration is that you can afford to gloss over articulating your economic policy. When you’re now the electorate’s favoured opposition and polled to win the next election, this advantage disappears.

Amid Britain’s economic slump, Nigel Farage must now convince voters that he can chart a course out of it. However, under the fiscal limelight on Monday’s speech in the City of London, his latest positions on the most critical economic questions hardly differ from Labour orthodoxy.

Raising the income tax to £20,000? Relegated to an “aspiration”. Scrapping the two-child benefits cap? Only for families of UK nationals where both parents work — this constitutes a very small fraction, since 59% of families affected by the cap have at least one working parent. It’s only the triple lock, Britain’s most explosive political landmine, where he’s wisely maintained strategic ambiguity.

It was easy to tauntingly promise tax cuts before May’s local elections while Labour squirmed under looming tax rises. Likewise, it’s easy to antagonise Starmer by saying you’ll scrap the two-child benefits tax after he suspended several rebel MP’s over it. Yet, these outflanking tactics are no longer suitable. Now Reform has been polled to win the next election for over a year, it’s apparent that delivering an economic strategy palatable to its voters clashes with cold hard economic reality.

For a party whose membership is largely lower and middle-income, Farage has an almost schizophrenic attitude towards growth. He exalts financial services as a silver (sterling?) bullet, advocating in true Thatcherite style for a second Big Bang of deregulation to unleash their potential. Then, without missing a beat, he declares that Reform is the “party of small business” despite consistently portraying local economies’ immigrant-run enterprises as hotbeds of tax evasion. In Farage’s dreams, high streets swarming with scheming Turkish barbers must become lined with smiling ham-fisted grocers whistling the national anthem.

It’s doubtful that these visions of a resurrected financial services sector are realistic. The current contraction is so deep and wide that radical deregulation can only do so much. British financial businesses have declined by 11% since their 2020 peak and a survey of 650 companies spanning the service sector — which includes finance, IT, communications and property but excludes retail — found that it had the biggest fall in orders in almost three years. Deregulation won’t lure back the British companies that continue listing in America’s glimmeringly deep capital markets.

Cost-of-living has consistently been the public’s chief concern. Yet, Farage’s mantras of deregulation are clearly to appease the ultra-rich city donors he relies on — three-quarters of Reform’s donations since 2019 are linked to offshore financial entities — rather than his lower and middle-income white core. It’s much easier to sell them the dangers of unfettered immigration than trickle-down economics. His sermons on deregulation aren’t what they want to hear.

Valorising SME’s (small/medium enterprises) connects much better to these voters’ concerns. Inconveniently, while under 15% of UK residents are foreign born, 39% of Britain’s fastest-growing start-ups have at least one foreign founder. No wonder Farage avoided mentioning immigration in his speech. Besides, he’s equivocating about how exactly he’ll revitalise SME’s out of their current slump with one in three expecting to cut operations, sell up, or shut down. He urges Reeves to lower the minimum wage for younger works or to raise the threshold for employer National Insurance contributions, yet skirted away from committing to either.

British migration is at pre-Brexit levels and the effect of this on immigration-intensive industries like construction is already apparent. So far, Farage has been able to ride high on anti-immigration rhetoric. But as the economic necessity of immigration becomes harder to ignore, whether he can reckon with this while distinguishing himself from Labour’s macroeconomic orthodoxy will be a defining test for his campaign.

Originally published with New Tide Network as their monthly article, here.

As a Tibetan journalist and activist, I often feel disappointed by the way Western media covers issues related to communities from the margins. Through working in student journalism and interning at the Financial Times, I’ve observed how such coverage tends to exaggerate similarities and minimise differences. Recently, I wrote about how the international discourse romanticises Nepal’s so-called “Gen Z Revolution” and misconstrues India’s democratic backsliding, but another topic warrants mentioning: Western media coverage of Beijing’s plans to build a controversial mega-embassy in London.

Despite widespread coverage of this issue, I’ve noticed that very few stories include voices from those affected most by the proposal, such as community members with family ties to China and activists focusing on human rights violations in the region. When such protestors’ concerns are mentioned, they’re mentioned obliquely and—more importantly—homogeneously. Different demographics clearly face different threats from transnational repression at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), yet Western coverage often smothers the differences between them.

A Uyghur protestor with family in Xinjiang, where there is an ongoing crackdown on the ethnic minority group, faces a very different set of threats compared to a Taiwanese student protestor without any family in mainland China. For the former, the mega-embassy poses a threat as a potential vehicle of coercion targeting not just overseas Uyghurs, but also their family members in Xinjiang. For the latter, the embassy may serve as a means for the party to counteract dissent on university campuses and suffocate academic freedom. Yet these nuances are often lost in mainstream coverage of this topic, which not only flattens these communities’ concerns but also feeds into the CCP’s racial philosophy of zhonghua minzu (the notion of a Chinese nationality transcending ethnicity) that submerges minorities within a collective Chinese family and history.

By not elaborating upon different demographics’ specific concerns and experiences, the nuanced and myriad techniques of the CCP’s surveillance and transnational repression campaigns are largely left unexamined in many recent reports. Such omissions also exacerbate the discordance I see around the British public’s perceptions of China, which often consists of unsubstantiated conspiracies and simplistic narratives about “China’s plan for world domination”. These narratives are not only often racist—reinforcing discrimination against people of Chinese descent abroad—but also discourage critical examination of the CCP’s specific policies and strategies.

When coverage portrays opponents of the CCP’s human rights abuses as a homogenous mass with identical struggles, only the voices of those affected can illuminate where these struggles overlap and diverge. More broadly, there can be no accurate coverage of China that doesn’t include our perspectives — and such coverage is desperately needed as we move forward into the new year.

Puja outside a temple in Bhaktapur, Nepal.

A version of this piece was published by The Wire.

Amid the coverage of the recent Nepali political overthrow — starting with mass September 8th protests in Kathmandu and resulting in the resignation of the PM and inauguration of a former Supreme Court chief justice until elections in March — the overall tone is optimistic and congratulatory.

Commentators present the young protesters as a political force there to stay. Indeed, multiple mainstream outlets have dubbed the unrest as the “Gen Z Protests”. In a recent piece Karishma Vaswani, Bloomberg’s opinion columnist covering Asia, calls them “Nepal’s new power brokers”. The narrative seems to be that future Nepali administrations won’t enjoy the same endemic unaccountability and corruption faced with a newly emboldened swathe of the electorate; around half of Nepal’s population is aged 0-40.

But international coverage’s narrow political focus excludes two potent actors from discussion. Throughout the revolving door of Nepal’s three main political parties, the army and the police have held enormous influence since it became a republic in 2008. They have been critical in brutally suppressing dissent against its 14 successive governments. Unless the next political administration lessens their influence, Nepal’s democratisation will remain severely constrained.

Living between the cities of Kathmandu, Boudha, and Lalitpur during last year’s summer while I studied Tibetan grammar, I saw how ubiquitous Nepal’s police is. From patrolling busy shopping centres, to operating checkpoints at city borders, to directing traffic at main junctions, it has various municipal roles alongside its policing ones. Similarly, the army builds and maintains rural critical infrastructure like bridges, roads, and healthcare in rural regions, and has primary responsibility for natural disaster relief.

The brutality and impunity of the army and police is commensurate with their ubiquity. The latest protests were met with live ammunition; so far, 72 civilians have been murdered and at least 2,000 injured. Nepali police have long used disproportionate force to suppress protests, ranging from water cannons against civilians to batons against teacher unions. This trend dates back to the 1996-2006 civil war between Maoist insurgents and Nepal’s monarchy, characterised by widespread war crimes and enforced disappearances. In 2014, Nepal formed two commissions to investigate them; they have registered over 60,000 cases and failed to resolve even one. To date, there has not been one prosecution for torture since the crime was recognised in Nepali law in 2018.

In return for repressing on behalf of the state, the army and police freely embezzle public funding. For example, the Centre of Investigative Journalism Nepal tracked Nepal’s 2020 COVID-19 Fund and found that the Ministry of Defence directed almost half of government expenditure — more than spent by the Ministry of Health — to Nepal’s army which claims it used the money procuring masks and sanitisers. The army is increasingly commercially active through endeavours like revitalising defunct textiles factories and is lobbying to overturn a law which limits its investment into business enterprises. So far, this money-for-might contract is poised to blossom.

The army implementing a curfew — since lifted — and negotiating with the youth is motivated by containment, not support. Elections are scheduled for March. With parliament dissolved and former Chief Justice Sushila Karki inaugurated the interim Nepali PM on September 12th, it has plenty of time to build its influence.

Karki’s history of ardently combating corruption makes her a promising candidate for election. In 2017, she was suspended as Chief Justice after the two main parties in the ruling coalition launched impeachment proceedings against her in response to the Supreme Court overturning their appointment of Chief of Police. Her suspension was seen as politically motivated, with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at the time describing her removal as “[giving] rise to serious concerns about the Government's commitment to transitional justice and the rule of law".

However, Karki declared she will hand over power to the next administration. This decision is a boon for the army and police; their greatest threat is now out of the running. The likeliest winner of March’s elections is the Kathmandu Mayor Balendra Shah, who enjoys significant support among Nepali youth. A rapper with a strong social media presence who has clashed with federal government and pushed for urban reform in Kathmandu, his anti-establishment branding and party-independence chimes with the youth’s revolutionary fervour. He was swift to tweet his support for the protests and endorse Karki.

Youth support does not determine suitability. Shah’s mayorship has been characterised by a populist, gung-ho style and cruel and counterproductive crackdowns on marginalised groups. Symbolising this, soon after being elected he deployed police to evict squatters from informal settlements around Kathmandu; the police miscalculated the squatters’ strength and retreated with a dozen officers injured, including the Police Chief. He has also deployed police violence to remove street vendors from Kathmandu’s sidewalks, despite official statistics finding that the informal economy employs 74% of workers and contributes to 39% of GDP.

Overthrowing Nepal’s corrupt and inept three-party political cabal is welcome. But comprehensive democratisation requires severing the money-for-might contract between the army, government, and police. Karki would have been the best candidate for this, but her decision to not stand for re-election opens the door to Shah’s likely election. His history of weaponising police violence as Kathmandu Mayor suggest that he’ll continue to do so as PM. International discussion of Nepal’s political overthrow has largely overlooked the influence of Nepal’s army and police. As long as they do, celebration is inaccurate and premature.

Image sourced from BYD

BYD, the Chinese electric vehicle (EV) and battery manufacturer, has had a brilliant run. Reaching over one million EV and hybrid vehicle sales in Q1 2025[1], overtaking Tesla as the world’s best-selling EV manufacturer[2], and doubling its first-quarter profit from a year earlier[3], its momentum seems inexhaustible as it seeks to further its success in overseas EV exports. Here, it has also made leaps — it outsold Tesla in Europe for the first time in May[4].

But look closely under the bonnet and complications emerge. BYD is still heavily reliant on its domestic market — in the first five months of 2025, China accounted for 80% of total sales[5]. This domestic market is cooling. A survey by the China Automotive Dealer Association in May found that BYD dealers held an average inventory of 3.21 months — the highest among all Chinese EV manufacturers — compared to the industry average of 1.38 months.

Correspondingly, BYD has slowed its output. Data from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers showed that BYD’s output growth slowed to 0.2% year-on-year in May, with average April and May output 29% lower than in Q4 of 2024. BYD has also cancelled night shifts and reduced production by at least a third at some factories, and its large dealership in Shandong has gone out of business[6].

But despite slowing output and viciously cutting prices across 22 models by up to 34%[7] in May, domestic demand seems exhausted. While June saw BYD’s highest amount of sales this year — up 11.98% year-on-year — this represented a minuscule increase of 0.03% from May, the third consecutive month of growth below 1%. Within this, plug-in hybrid electric vehicle sales actually decreased 1.05% after the price cuts[8]. BYD’s market penetration in China is now such that price cuts yield negligible marginal returns in terms of demand while invoking ominous warnings from regulatory bodies threatening “corrective action”[9]. Investors’ recognise this: BYD’s Hong Kong-listed share price dropped by more than 9% immediately after news of the price cuts[10].

Facing inert domestic demand, it is imperative for BYD to expand its exports. They have grown rapidly, with June’s exports representing a 233.58% year-on-year increase and up around 30% since January[11]. Europe is at the heart of BYD’s international expansion, with European sales including Britain tripling in Q1 2025[12].

But BYD’s increasing European sales must also be contextualised against a very low baseline. Although BYD has driven the increased demand for hybrid vehicles which are exempt from the higher tariffs that battery-powered EV’s face[13] — the BYD Seal U was the third-bestselling hybrid vehicle in the first half of 2025[14] — Chinese market share of European EV’s has doubled to just 5.1%[15]. BYD’s ambition to onshore production into Europe has also been stymied, with an EU Commission probe into Chinese subsidies behind its €4bn Hungarian plant prompting BYD to shift production to Turkey[16].

This regulatory obstruction represents strange mixed messages from the EU. Antipathy to distorting Chinese subsidies is understandable, but the probe represents the bloc’s mistrust of deepening economic ties between Hungary and China — Hungary accounted for a quarter of Chinese investment into Europe since 2022[17] — and jealousy that China is not providing technology transfer of its EV know-how.
The Hungarian plant alone is projected to create 10,000 jobs[18] and Europe can hardly expect BYD to share its coveted technology, nor even capitalise on it given China’s stranglehold over critical minerals for EV batteries. Given the compelling logic of deepening supply-chain intertwinement with China in light of Donald Trump’s aggressive and erratic trade protectionism, one wonders when enough will be enough for Brussels.

Nevertheless, this probe indicates that Brussels dislikes Chinese subsidies enough to unravel near-complete production plans; an attitude that looms over BYD’s engagement with the bloc.

BYD has penetrated the Chinese market so deeply that radical price and output cuts seem powerless to revive BYD’s flatlining domestic demand. With domestic demand accounting for 80% of sales, pivoting to Europe is imperative. However, BYD’s rapid growth in Europe is impressive but still a drop in the ocean — its European market share is 1%[17]. Amid regulatory obstacles and a wider slowdown in European automobile demand[18], BYD is still a long way from transcending its domestic market and capturing Europe’s.

[1] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-08/byd-flags-bumper-first-quarter-profit-as-sales-top-1-million

[2] https://www.ft.com/content/716c9b0b-d8cd-491a-a91b-d70c1e540797

[3] https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/byds-first-quarter-profit-doubles-2025-04-25/

[4] https://www.cnbc.com/2025/05/23/byd-beats-tesla-in-european-ev-sales-despite-higher-tariffs-report.html

[5] https://en.ilsole24ore.com/art/byd-slows-down-china-production-but-accelerates-europe-AH7efoOB

[6] https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/byd-slows-production-delays-capacity-expansion-china-factories-sources-say-2025-06-25/

[7] https://electrek.co/2025/06/13/byd-says-ev-price-war-not-sustainable-yet-still-slashes-prices/

[8] https://cnevpost.com/2025/07/01/byd-sells-382585-nevs-jun-2025/

[9] https://www.ft.com/content/74958651-ec86-4a07-a743-502445f54553

[10] https://www.cnbc.com/2025/05/26/chinas-byd-sees-shares-plunge-8percent-as-ev-maker-cuts-prices.html#:~:text=The%20plunge%20of%20more%20than,stiffer%20competition%20in%20the%20sector.

[11] https://cnevpost.com/2025/07/01/byd-sells-382585-nevs-jun-2025/

[12] https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/china-ev-giant-byd-reboots-europe-operations-after-strategic-stumbles-sources-2025-04-23/

[13] https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/chinese-ev-makers-sell-more-plugin-hybrids-eu-avoid-tariffs-research-firm-says-2025-05-01/#:~:text=BYD%20pays%20a%2027%25%20tariff%20on%20BEVs%20it%20sells%20in,PHEV%2C%20it%20pays%203%2C999%20euros.

[14] https://cnevpost.com/2025/07/23/chinese-car-brands-double-share-europe-h1-2025/

[15] https://www.jato.com/resources/media-and-press-releases/chinese-car-brands-continue-their-ascent-outselling-mercedes-in-june-and-ford-in-h1

[16] https://www.digitimes.com/news/a20250724PD216/byd-europe-hungary-turkey-plant-automakers.html

[17[ https://www.ft.com/content/ca5f5ce6-46ad-4a34-80b1-b0f7d4b17d58

[18] https://www.ft.com/content/0ef28741-6194-4ee6-8f23-945415de7458

[19] https://fortune.com/2025/07/29/byd-china-electric-cars-europe-hungary-manufacturing/#:~:text=BYD%20sold%20nearly%2055%2C000%20cars,analysts%E2%80%94to%20gain%20market%20share.

[20] https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/european-car-sales-slump-june-automakers-woes-deepen-2025-07-24/#:~:text=Sales%20in%20the%20European%20Union,%25%20and%208.7%25%2C%20respectively.

Image created with MicrosoftDesigner

Over the past couple of weeks, I’ve had lots of articles about UK pension reform pass my desk. The writers make some compelling arguments for the economic benefits of dynamising the UK’s bloated yet fragmented pensions system by corralling managers to invest in private assets. But there’s little appetite for it among the public or British investors living in this current economic stagnation. Even in the current uplift in British stocks, investors and companies are selling off. Indeed, Reeves has implemented these changes while international pension funds are rethinking their exposure to private assets. Until Brits’ pervasive risk-aversion fades, Reeves’ pension reforms will sound hollow to deaf ears, no matter their merits.

The UK has the third-largest pension market in the world by total assets, worth £3tn. But it also has one of the least dynamic. 38% of assets are bonds while just 30% of overall funds are allocated to equities — the fourth-lowest proportion of any pensions market in the world. This year, the UK recorded the weakest growth in its pension assets among the seven biggest pension markets in the last decade. Britain saw a -0.4% decline while the others saw an average growth of 3.4%. It’s also the only country among 22 studied to have seen negative pensions growth this year.

Given this, Reeves has understandably lasered in on pension reform as the economic lightning bolt she so badly needs. June 5th’s Pensions Bill would allow the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator to force workplaces with direct contribution (DC) schemes to invest in specific equity including private debt, venture capital, and property. Reeves also signed a pact with the 17 biggest pension fund managers to invest at least 10% of their default funds in private markets by the end of the decade, with half of these funds ringfenced for the UK. As a kick up the arse to get them into action, the bill also mandates that multi-employer DC schemes have assets of at least £25bn by 2035.

The logic of revitalising Britain’s flatlining stock market since 2008, stemming the flight of British start-ups publicly listing in the US, and encouraging pension investment into Labour’s expensive infrastructure projects reads nicely. But it stands in stark contrast to investor and public sentiment. Driven by the scramble to diversify from American markets, British stocks are set to have their best half-year run since 2021 and overseas inflows into British equity have hit a three-year high. Foreign direct investment into Britain remains the second-highest in the EU despite bloc-wide declines. In spite of this, British investors have been net sellers all year. If British investors are currently selling in this unusual uplift, can we expect them to buy when times are leaner?

Clearly, even when UK stocks have a rare comparative advantage, British investors still don’t believe in them. Interestingly, this wariness is even mirrored in the activities of major FTSE 100 players. Over the past couple of years, dozens of British companies have offloaded assets and operations: the National Grid sold its UK gas network to the Australian investment bank Macquarie (infamously a major stakeholder and dividend pirate of Thames Water…); Barclays is negotiating selling its UK payments business to a Canadian investment giant; the engineering conglomerate Smiths Group is breaking up; and, depressingly, Unilever is re-listing its ice cream business — which owns Ben & Jerry’s, Calippo, and Magnum — to Amsterdam. Not very summery.

This de-risking and preparing for leaner times is also reflected in public sentiment. A survey last year found that 69% of respondents prioritise protecting their pension savings over a higher return. 94% of members of defined benefit contribution schemes say it’s important that “politicians can’t interfere with my pension”. These opinions seem to be held in a vacuum of actually knowing what pensions are. While 53% of respondents to a different survey thought they were knowledgeable about pensions, only a third could name the different kinds. Fair enough — pensions aren’t the sexiest topic and I didn’t know much until articles about them came across my desk. But government will find it hard to sell pension reform to a widespread combination of risk-aversion and ignorance.

It’s also not at all a given that pension funds will be able to keep riding on American returns as they have until now. Many large ones are diversifying from the US, particularly into Asian markets. American risks include its creaking debt burden; the looming decline in productivity — particularly in the services industry — that mass deportations will cause and that will only become apparent in this winter’s or next year’s US jobs reports; and the very real possibility that Trump opening up Americans’ 401k pensions to illiquid and opaque private markets will lead funds like Apollo and KKR to offload risky assets, as private equity struggles with diminishing returns and fundraising. All of which illustrate how Reeves is seeking riskier pension investments while international players are increasingly wary of global and particularly American exposure.

Leveraging pension funds’ dormant capital could be a very useful economic tool for Britain, as it has been for many other nations. But with such tepid sentiment among British investors and the public — even during British stocks’ current rare uplift — I wonder whether Reeves’ reforms will be enough to rouse UK pension managers into meaningful action. Particularly given international funds’ realisation that easy American returns aren’t guaranteed. With our pallid economic outlook, Reeves hasn’t got much license to ask taxpayers to accept her leveraging the pensions that are more valuable to them now than ever. Currently, Brits simply don’t have enough sense of a national project to get excited.

Scared money don’t make money.

Image sourced from Larry Farr: https://unsplash.com/photos/prison-backyard-BFJC05gzLXo

Abrego Garcia is a name that will leave a lasting historical impact. Fleeing from extortion by gangs in his birthplace of El Salvador, Garcia was in 2019 granted “withholding of removal status”. He’s since lived peacefully in Maryland.
Until he was wrongfully deported to El Salvador on March 15th, along with hundreds of other suspected gang members in a wave of mass deportation by Trump’s administration.

Trump argues that federal courts are powerless “to direct the Executive Branch to conduct foreign relations in a particular way, or engage with a foreign sovereign in a given manner.” This is in the face of the Supreme Court’s April 10th 9-0 verdict that Garcia’s deportation was illegal and its command that Trump’s administration “facilitate” (but not “effect”) his return. Trump has exploited this semantic difference to argue that it must only facilitate Garcia’s repatriation should El Salvador’s President Bukele permit - not to actively bring it about. But Bukele, in many ways Trump’s mini-me, has repeatedly said he will not send Garcia back, calling it tantamount to “smuggling a terrorist into the United States”.

Whether Trump disobeys the Supreme Court could very well determine whether executive power has conclusively defeated legislative power in the US.

I want to focus on Bukele, however, and the blindsides he exposes in our liberal Western notions of democratic legitimacy. On March 27th 2022, the day after 62 people were killed seemingly by gangs, El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly declared a “state of emergency” that suspended the right to be informed about the reason of arrest, to remain silent, and to legal representation, and the requirement to take anyone detained before a judge within 72 hours”. That state of emergency is still in place.

Like it or not, it’s been effective. In 2015, El Salvador had 6,656 homicides that made it one of the world’s deadliest countries. Bukele was elected in 2019. In 2023, El Salvador recorded just 214 homicides. In 2024, it had just 1.9 homicides per 100,000 people: by far the lowest rate of any Latin American country. This has been achieved by mass arrest and detainment of suspected gang members and corrupt officials, almost always without a semblance of fair trial, in industrial-scale prison complexes with inhumane conditions. CECOT, Bukele’s flagship prison with a 40,000 capacity, has on average just 0.6 square metres of space per prisoner.

But the people love it. Bukele won the February 2024 election with 84.7% of the vote - 32% more than his first term in 2019 (although 2024 voter turnout was 52.6%) - and had a 91% approval rate in November, according to the reputable polling company Gallup, Inc. This is the highest average approval ratings of his presidency so far, and of any El Salvadoran president. Indeed, this is unprecedented for any president of a Western democracy. For example, Canada’s Mark Carney has been riding the tough-on-Trump PR wave whose crest is a current approval rating of just 48%.

Western commentators are justified in calling Bukele autocratic and his regime profoundly undemocratic. But whether Bukele is democratic (he’s obviously not) is a very different question from whether he has democratic legitimacy.

The minimal condition for democratic legitimacy is popular approval. This comes before any further considerations such as political plurality, rule of law, etc. which almost always accompany democracy but aren’t strictly necessary conditions for it. Democratically legitimate leaders needn’t be democratic. (Incidentally, in a genuine democracy voters wouldn’t be able to stop being democratic. Since their concern would be able to elect and remove leaders, they’d have created a constitution that forbids this).

To be legitimising, popular approval doesn’t even have to be well-founded. It’s a central liberal maxim that all people have a right to express their opinions in political discourse, and that these opinions be recognised as valid political instruments. This validity isn’t affected by opinions’ content and underlying rationale, nor - in the case of expressions of political approval - by the politics of who’s being approved. An irrational bigot’s vote for a fascist leader is just as valid as a political analyst’s vote for a democratic one.

Bukele’s popularity should remind liberal commentators that to an El Salvadoran who just a few years ago had to contend with one of the world’s highest murder rates, democratic legitimacy is a much more distant concern than personal safety. El Salvadorans don’t need liberal Western commentators to tell them what Bukele’s doing to democracy. And it’s a potent indication of commentators’ privilege if they’re aghast at how El Salvadorans can vote for him.

Bukele is at once a very undemocratic leader and one of the most democratically legitimate ones in the world, by the standard of voter approval. Appreciating this difference not only grants insights into populism in countries where voters have much more immediate concerns than democratic checks-and-balances. It also helps expose how easily we commit the fallacy of judging democratic expression by whether it’s calling for democracy. A fundamental liberal premise is that all citizens’ opinions, founded by their concerns, are equally valid instruments of political legitimation. No matter what they are.

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Source: unsplash.com

Cuts had to come from somewhere, given the OBR’s downgrading of an already dire growth forecast and a rash peer-pressured commitment to increasing defence spending to 2.5% of GDP. None of the options were painless, although the Chancellor must feel increasingly constrained within her self-imposed fiscal shackles.
But the welfare cuts aimed at saving £5bn/year aren’t only just unpopular with Labour MP’s and the public. They fundamentally don’t address the reasons behind Britain’s spiralling welfare bill, which centre on (i) miscalibrated structural incentives in the benefits system and (ii) a severe bottleneck from benefits to employment.
Not, contrary to previous orthodoxy, a “sick-note culture” of shirkers. Reducing Britain’s welfare bill in the long-term requires addressing these two factors. Cuts are just a short-term fix, and political self-harm.

So, what’s highlighted welfare as a candidate for budget cuts? The spiralling costs of specifically health-related benefits. Currently, net disability and incapacity benefits amount to £75bn/year. Their largest components are Personal Independence Payment (PIP) and health-related Universal Credit. PIP is paid to cover the extra costs of being disabled, regardless of whether one is working. Health-related UC is the UC paid to specifically those whose health or disability prevents them from working.

The OBR predicts that net disability and incapacity benefit costs will reach £92bn by the end of the decade, on par with defence spending. Importantly, as illustrated above, health-related UC payments have particularly ballooned and are forecast to increase at the rapidest rate.

Sunak’s administration sought to justify welfare slashes with the premise that the UK had a unique crisis of rapidly rising chronic illness in the working-age population, including mental illness in young people. Remember him declaring in April last year that he’d end Britain’s “sick-note culture” [1] and the Labour Manifesto promising in June that it’d “get Britain working again” [2]? This narrative fuelled a real right-wing uproar that pandering to mental illness allows shirkers or hypochondriacs to escape work and receive benefits.

Newer and better data disproved this premise. In Britain, measures of economic inactivity due to long-term illness are far more closely indexed by the rates of people receiving incapacity benefits, rather than by increasing chronic illness in the working-age population [3].

Of course, I acknowledge the sharp rise in mental illness over this century. Mental illness is a valid reason why someone may feel unable to work full-time. But the debate around welfare cuts must recognise the bitter pill that the increasing welfare bill is in part driven by health-related benefits being more attractive than unemployment benefits.

Currently, a single person receives over twice as many benefits if awarded health-related UC compared to standard UC [4]. If a single adult receives health-related-UC and standard UC along with PIP, they can receive almost thrice as much support as somebody on standard UC. This holds true for families, too, albeit to a lesser degree. Simultaneously, standard unemployment benefits’ real-value have fallen dramatically to below pre-COVID measures [5].

Looking closely at the trends of people entering and leaving benefits (onflows and off-flows), a critical pattern emerges: the proportion of health-related benefits within overall caseloads changes with their approval rates and generosity.

Greater approval rates accounted for nearly 50% of the increase in onflows between 2010-2011 and 2022-2023, while initial claims and dropout rates accounted for just 20% and 30%, respectively [6]. These greater approval rates were almost entirely in the more-severely incapacitated group. In 2017, the DWP changed benefits policy so that claimants in the less-severely incapacitated group would receive less benefits than those in the more-severely incapacitated group, and the latter group’s benefits weren’t conditional upon them seeking work.

Now, let’s look at how onflows and off-flows changed since 2017, when more-severely incapacitated benefits became more generous and easier to obtain. Tellingly, 2017 marks the start of the surge in onflows.

You might be wondering why I’m stressing this point. But it’s exactly what government seems to have missed. Redistributing money from health-related UC to standard UC and PIP would help create parity between different benefits’ incentives, and in a cost-neutral manner. For example, government could freeze health-related UC benefits for all but (say) the poorest 20% of recipients, and allocate the saved money to other benefits . Repeatedly assessing more-severely incapacitated UC claimants under appropriate criteria would also ensure that those who become able to seek work do so.

Instead, Labour has focussed on restricting eligibility for PIP. If these restrictions do save £5bn, they do so by cutting between 800,000 and 1.2mn people’s support of £4,300/year if they receive the standard Daily Living rate or £6,300/year if they receive the Enhanced Daily Living rate [7].
Labour will also scrap the Working Capabilities Assessment (WCA) from 2028-29 onwards, used to assess whether an individual claiming health-related UC is still capable of seeking work. Those who are capable receive smaller amounts of health-related UC. Currently, 600,000 claimants receive this smaller amount while not receiving PIP. If WCA is abolished and PIP eligibility criteria tightened, some of these claimants will lose both health-related UC and PIP [8]. This could amount to a crippling loss of £9,600/year for each claimant.

PIP is the single most expensive benefit, accounting for 35% of benefits costs in 2024-25 compared to health-related UC accounting for 23%. But it’s the wrong target.
As we’ve seen, health-related UC as a proportion of welfare costs is increasing much faster than PIP. And it isn’t as if onflows to PIP are significantly higher than onflows onto health-related UC. In fact, from 2018-19 to 2022-23, onflows onto health-related UC increased by 111% compared to a 98% increase for PIP [9]. Similarly, approval rates for PIP have actually slightly declined from 55% in 2018-19 to 51% in 2022-23, whereas approval rates for health-related UC increased from 66% to 81% over that same period [10]. There isn’t even the argument that tightening PIP eligibility reduces benefits fraud. By the DWP’s own reckoning, PIP fraud rates were at practically 0% while UC fraud was at 10.9% in 2024 [11].

There are separate reasons why it’s frustrating to see Labour scrap WCA. There’s currently a major bottleneck between health-related UC and employment: only 1% of those receiving health-related UC are in work within 6 months, compared to 33% of unemployed people [12]. This can certainly be partially attributed to an enduring labour market contraction post-COVID, but there's wildly insufficient support to get people back into work: every year, only 10% of disabled claimants receive help in job-seeking [13]. Simultaneously, PIP claimants are staying signed-on longer and longer [14]. This bottleneck is significantly worsened by the fact that seeking work means having incapacity benefits reassessed and potentially removed. This hugely disincentivises claimants from trying to enter the labour market.

So, let’s wrap this up. We’re in a situation where standard UC has fallen below pre-COVID real-value, while incapacity benefits (PIP and health-related UC) are up to twice as generous and far likelier to be awarded. No wonder claimants are switching to incapacity benefits. Equally, don’t twist this into evidence that we have a crisis of benefits scroungers. One in five people who are economically inactive due to long-term sickness say they want a job, and one in three incapacity benefits claimants feel they could work now or in the future. But only 1 in 10 recipients of disabilities benefits are helped to find work ]15]. The will to work is there, but the support to get working isn’t. Liz Kendall’s “right to try guarantee”, under which incapacity benefits recipients will no longer risk losing their benefits if they seek work, is a promising step in this direction.

For these reasons, while PIP is the biggest expense it shouldn’t be the scapegoat. Parity should be created between incapacity benefits and standard UC, and claimants - especially disabled ones - should be helped back into the labour market.
Labour’s PIP eligibility cuts and scrapping of WCA in 2028-29 will have catastrophic fallout - by some reckonings, the welfare cuts could push at least 250,000 people beneath the poverty line [16]. Ironically, these changes benefit only those claimants without health problems or a disability.

[1] https://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/1889944/Rishi-Sunak-Welfare-sick-note-benefits-Tory-Party

[2] https://labour.org.uk/updates/stories/labours-plan-to-get-britain-working/

[3] https://www.ft.com/content/1409c952-28c0-4a3f-be90-493234a949b2

[4] https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/under-strain/

[5] Ibid.

[6] https://obr.uk/wtr/welfare-trends-report-october-2024/

[7] https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/a-dangerous-road/

[8] Ibid.

[9] see [6]

[10] see [6]

[11] https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/fraud-and-error-in-the-benefit-system-financial-year-2023-to-2024-estimates/fraud-and-error-in-the-benefit-system-financial-year-ending-fye-2024#universal-credit-overpayments-and-underpayments

[12] https://learningandwork.org.uk/resources/research-and-reports/the-benefit-trap/

[13] Ibid.

[14] https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/under-strain/

[15] see [12]

[16] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/reeves-benefit-cuts-spring-statement-b2721998.html

Image sourced from Unsplashed (Kevin Schmid)

Glancing at a shop’s newspaper rack, you’d be hard pressed to find a paper whose front page doesn’t have some mention of defence. The discussion about upgrading Europe’s defence capabilities - largely sparked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine - has intensified after Trump’s declaration that American forces will not be deployed for peacekeeping efforts in Ukraine. Europe now has to look out for its own security.

In Whitehall, there’s fierce discussion of how to upgrade Britain’s defences. British defence spending has steadily declined from 11% of GDP in 1950 to 2.3% today [1]. The case for spending more on defence depends on how well the money will be used.
But very little discussion evaluates Britain’s track record on defence spending. Which raises the questions:
What’s the state of British defence right now? And what are the specific ways in which Britain’s defences should be upgraded?

The sheer wastefulness of the MoD is astounding. A 2023-2024 report by the independent National Audit Office into the MoD [2] illustrated how inefficient its projects are. Of the 52 projects in the 2022-2023 Government Major Projects Portfolio, 5 were rated Red, 41 rated Amber, and only 2 rated Green (two others were exempt). Red rating means the “successful delivery of the project appears to be unachievable” due to “major issues with project definition, schedule, budget, quality and/or benefits delivery”. Amber means “successful delivery appears feasible but significant issues already exist”.

The Red rated projects aren’t insignificant ones: they include the next generation fighter aircraft, the programme to deliver nuclear submarine reactor cores, two programmes providing missiles to the RAF, and the MoD’s base information and communications technology.
See this article by Richard Norton, former Guardians security editor for over 30 years, for a damning list of MoD waste [3].

This isn’t confined to past projects, either. A separate NAO report into the MoD’s Equipment Plan for 2023-2033 [4] found that the plan exceeded MoD’s estimates by £16.9bn, the largest deficit since the MoD first published Equipment Plans in 2012. This report doesn’t include the UK’s £12.8bn support to Ukraine [5].

Perhaps most embarrassingly, Trident missiles twice in a row failed to take-off on test launches, going “plop” into the Atlantic [6]. Despite increasing nuclear weapons spending by 17% in 2023 - the greatest rise by any country except America [7]. So much for the credibility of the UK’s vaunted nuclear deterrent…

I present this quick overview of the MoD’s inefficiency to show the very real risk of increased defence spending going to waste. A risk obscured by the panicked rhetoric splashed across mainstream news about the Russian threat. What is this threat anyway? It obviously isn’t the same threat of land invasion faced by the European continent. The Russian army has 1,500,000 military personnel, whereas the pooled forces of the largest four European armies (in order, Ukraine, Poland, France, and Germany) amounts to only 1,485,000 [8]. Baltic and eastern European states are certainly threatened by land invasion. But not Britain.

The Russian threats faced by Britain are sabotage. Specifically, naval sabotage and cyberattacks. This is a major theme over recent years. Finland and Sweden are currently investigating suspected multiple incidents of sabotage of its telecom cables in the Baltic Sea [9]. One of the damaged cables is the only direct fibre-optic connection between Finland and central Europe. Officials suspect the damage is caused by Russian tankers dragging anchors across the seabed [10].
Only last month a Russian spy ship was found lurking in British waters directly above critical undersea infrastructure [11]. Building Britain’s diminished naval fleet of just 19 warships [12] should be a major focus, as should ensuring they’re actually fit for service. The twelve destroyers have been plagued by design flaws - only three are currently operational [13].

Russia has a colourful recent history of cyberattacks on European adversaries. I don’t think I need to detail them here. However, according to those in charge of British cybersecurity, Britain leaves itself vulnerable to them. The head of GCHQ’s National Cyber Security Centre warned in December that the cyber threats facing the UK are “widely underestimated” and that its guidance “needs to be put into practice much more across the board” [14]. The forthcoming Strategic Defence Review, to be published later this year, should contain concrete proposals on how to rapidly upgrade Britain’s cyber defence capabilities.

This should be in concerto with European allies, and Britain should engage with European cyber security legislation to standardise its approach [15]. The creation of Nordic Warden, a UK-led collaboration with ten northern European countries using AI to track Russia’s shadow fleet, is a promising start [16].

Amidst all the shouts of “we need more defence spending”, we’d do well to remember just how much spending has been wasted. True, funding cuts have certainly contributed to this wastage. But much of it is caused by stifling bureaucracy, convoluted procurement chains, poor engineering, and a “hollowing out” that uses showy equipment like Trident and aircraft carriers to project military might while masking the underlying absence of core capabilities.

Sabotage is the biggest threat Britain faces from Russia. Resources should go into countering that, not into heavy equipment for conventional warfare that’s perpetually undergoing repairs. The target of spending (at least) 2.5% of GDP on defence will rely heavily on tax rises (an estimated £12bn worth [17]) and further cuts to public services.
These can only be justified by showing they’re value-for-money. From Britain’s track record, that’d be a first.

[1] https://milex.sipri.org/sipri

[2] https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/ministry-of-defence-overview-2023-24.pdf

[3] https://www.declassifieduk.org/how-britain-is-wasting-its-defence-budget/

[4]https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/equipment-plan-2023-to-2033/

[5] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-support-to-ukraine-factsheet/uk-support-to-ukraine-factsheet#:~:text=In%20total%2C%20the%20UK%20has,billion%20in%20non%2Dmilitary%20support

[6] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/feb/21/labour-seeks-trident-assurances-after-missile-test-anomaly

[7] https://www.nuclearinfo.org/comment/2024/06/uk-nuclear-weapons-spending-rises-to-6-5bn/#:~:text=These%20two%20programmes%20cost%20%C2%A3,nuclear%20weapons%20in%202022%2F23.

[8] https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/the-largest-armies-in-europe-are-6-to-7-times-smaller-than-russias-a-look-at-europes-top-ten-armies-5252

[9] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/21/finland-sweden-probe-suspected-sabotage-of-undersea-telecoms-cable

[10] https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/02/21/finland-germany-submarine-cable-damaged-again-in-baltic-sea-in-possible-sabotage-act/

[11] https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/02/21/finland-germany-submarine-cable-damaged-again-in-baltic-sea-in-possible-sabotage-act/

[11] https://www.ft.com/content/8f0306f8-e006-4015-a52e-57df16743bd3

[12] https://www.ft.com/content/8251f12b-0296-47f0-a774-3b7c99b9e53d

[13] https://www.ft.com/content/ac26be66-7b85-40a3-b2b6-900256866fd9

[14] https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/risk-facing-uk-widely-underestimated-cyber-chief-to-warn-in-first-major-speech

[15] https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/opinions/2025-critical-year-cybersecurity/

[16] https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/01/07/british-led-force-to-use-ai-in-tracking-russias-shadow-fleet/

[17] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/02/17/reeves-faces-12bn-tax-rises-meet-starmers-defence-spending/

Image sourced from Microsoft.

“Extremists” are persons who hold extreme beliefs which promote hatred or violence, while “terrorists” are persons who commit acts of serious violence against people or property that create serious risks to public health and safety. Measures against extremists focus on preventing ideological radicalisation, while measures against terrorists focus on preventing acts of terrorism.

However, two things have long been clear. An increasing amount of extremists don’t hold views that are coherent enough to constitute specific “ideologies” in the sense that, say, radical Salafism is a coherent and specific ideology. And, an increasing amount of terrorists are such non-ideological extremists.

This was the case even before 9/11 and the international equivocation of terrorism and extremism with Islam. Columbine, the most notorious school shooting, happened in April 1999. Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the perpetrators, were clearly terrorists. But they believed in no specific extremist ideology. The same has been true of the vast majority of American school shootings since.

It is also true of the incident that sparked the latest public interest in the UK about the definitions of extremism and terrorism: the Southport Killings perpetrated by Axel Rudakubana, an 18-year-old who murdered three girls in Southport on 29th July 2024. Axel was repeatedly reported to both local police and Prevent, the government’s anti-radicalisation programme, after multiple incidents of violence, knife-carrying, and engagement with extremist material online [1]. However, Prevent’s counter-terrorism officers closed his case after only visiting him once, rejecting his case on two further occassions.

A leaked Home Office report stated that the officers didn’t believe Axel was “in danger of being radicalised” since he had no clear ideology [2]. This is very significant. Some commentators argue that Axel was left unchecked because of a failure of administration. This has sparked widespread calls for the government to reconsider “extremism” beyond its traditional identification with radical Islamism.

In particular, a Home Office internal review of its extremism policy leaked to right-leaning think-tank Policy Exchange advised that the UK’s policy should take an “ideologically agnostic approach: not basing HMG’s approach on a definition [of extremism] or specific ideologies of concern, but on behaviours and activity of concern”. This broadening included engagement with “‘conspiracy theories’, misogyny, violence against women and girls, having ‘a fixture on gore and violence without adherence to an extremist ideology’, ‘preventing integration’, ‘influencing racism and intolerance’, or involvement in ‘an online subculture called the manosphere’” [3].

Home Secretary Yvette Cooper has rejected the Home Office review’s advice. In a response to the leak, Security Minister Dan Jarvis, said “Ideology, particularly Islamist extremism followed by far-right extremism, continue to be at the heart of our approach to countering extremism and counter terror. But as the horrific Southport attack shows, alongside that we also need more action on those drawn towards mixed ideologies and violence-obsessed young people” [4].

Labour’s refusal to adopt a behaviour-based definition of “extremism” that includes engagement with all kinds of extreme beliefs (whether or not they constitute specific ideologies) is disappointing. The empirical truth is that we live in a time where acts of terrorism are increasingly perpetrated by a new breed of terrorists who don’t stand for a specific extremist ideology.
Even the recent duality of extreme right-wing ideology as one of the two dominant extremist ideologies along with radical Islamism will soon be undermined by the proliferation of terrorists whose extreme beliefs are of (say) misogyny and glorification of violence, rather than of right-wing views. In fact, radical Islamism and far-right ideology are in a tiny minority of extremist beliefs that constitute a specific ideology. Most extremist beliefs don’t.
By insisting that extremism and terrorism must be ideologically-motivated, Labour ignores the reality that someone who kills three innocent girls in an obvious terrorist attack is still a terrorist without an ideology.

This isn’t just quibbling over definitions. A broader definition would have concrete legal and policy implications.
Prevent’s failure to intervene with Axel is not just an administrative failure. I think it’s directly representative of how the implicit premise that radicalisation requires identification with an ideology directly blindsides counter-terrorism and counter-extremism policy. Adopting a non-ideological definition will widen authorities’ focus so that terrorists like Axel no longer slip through the net. Given that Prevent relies on referrals from teachers, social workers, and concerned citizens, the general public must be encouraged to adopt the broader definition.
If the broader definition of “extremism” is adopted, acts of terrorism would be differentiated by degree rather than by whether or not they’re ideologically driven. Surely this is desirable. Differentiating by degree lends itself to creating consistent norms governing how acts of terror are prosecuted. Prosecution would be determined by the scale and heinousness of the act rather than whichever ideology (if any) the perpetrator seeks to advance.

There’s a counterargument that the new definition would overburden authorities. When asked whether the Metropolitan Police had sufficient resources for it, Dal Babu, former Chief Superintendent in the Metropolitan Police, replied “I think, to be perfectly honest, we’re at the moment struggling with the resources we have to deal with terrorism now” [5].

I agree that exhaustively investigating each and every case of somebody engaging in extremist content is inefficient and expensive. But Prevent already suffers from a staggering amount of false positives. 87% of reported cases do not meet the criteria for intervention and are not taken up by higher authorities [6]. Rather than allocating equal effort to each report, Prevent must engage with the socioeconomic and demographic determinants of (i) whether someone is referred and (ii) whether someone who is referred later commits an act of terrorism.

Being Muslim isn’t the only potential predictor of whether someone is prone to becoming an extremist and then a terrorist. Sufficiently analysing the myriad other predictors can provide invaluable insights into (i) and (ii), helping Prevent to decide which reports warrant which level of further investigation - of course, after a sufficient minimum of investigation is given to every case. Ridiculously, the Home Office keeps only “partial data on the ethnicity and religion of Prevent referrals and Channel cases”, along with incomplete data about social and economic status [7]. I know that collecting these data risks violations of privacy rights, but these risks are mitigable and maybe worth it.

I acknowledge that Islamist perpetrators do constitute the vast majority of terrorist attacks. In 2024, they accounted for 80% of the police’s counter-terrorist caseload [9] and 75% of MI5’s [10]. Although there’s a chicken-and-egg aspect in that these figures inherently reflect the overrepresentation of Muslims in terrorism investigations, it’s still the case that Islamist perpetrators are overrepresented in terrorist attacks. Counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategy and initiatives should as proportionately as possible focus on the greater threat posed by radical Islamists.
But the legal and political understanding of terrorism and extremism must recognise the increasing threat posed by those who are not.

By recognising that someone can be a terrorist without an extremist (or any) ideology, and that there are many very real and dangerous extreme beliefs which don’t constitute ideologies, the government can recognise the increasing threats posed by such terrorists. Terrorism and extremism aren’t and never were purely Islamic phenomena, nor even Islamist and right-wing extremist phenomena. A broader definition of “extremism” sets a positive legal precedent in which terrorist attacks are differentiated by the nature of the attack, not whether the perpetrator had a specific ideology.
Anti-radicalisation initiatives like Prevent must investigate the determinants of somebody transitioning from first engaging with extremist content to later committing acts of terrorism. Improved understanding of this is arguably the best way to ensure resources are allocated efficiently. This way, terrorism can be recognised and targeted as emerging from any or no ideology, as well as the radical Islamist ideologies it has traditionally emerged from.

This is a debate as critical as it is difficult, and will only become more important in time.

[1] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2025/jan/25/axel-rudakubana-from-unassuming-schoolboy-to-notorious-southport-killer

[2] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2025/jan/25/police-did-not-think-axel-rudakubana-would-be-radicalised-says-leaked-report

[3] https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Extremely-Confused-The-Governments-new-counter-extremism-review-revealed.pdf

[4] https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/mar/10/prevent-counter-extremism-programme-budget-to-be-slashed-in-london

[5] https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/jan/28/yvette-cooper-to-reject-call-to-broaden-extremism-definition-misogyny

[6] https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2023-11/Amnesty%20UK%20Prevent%20report%20%281%29.pdf?VersionId=.hjIwRZuHiGd1_lECXroFwg25jyBtwur

[7] Ibid.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-33718094

[8] https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/keir-starmer-southport-murders-terrorism-axel-rudakubana-b1206038.html

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2025/jan/28/yvette-cooper-to-reject-call-to-broaden-extremism-definition-misogyny

[9]https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/66473eddf34f9b5a56adc9e3/E03131940_HC_775_Lord_Walney_Review_Accessible.pdf

[10] https://www.mi5.gov.uk/director-general-ken-mccallum-gives-latest-threat-update

Image generated by Microsoft Designer.

Rebuilding Gaza is probably the greatest reconstruction challenge since post-war Warsaw. An April 2024 report from the World Bank estimated that rebuilding Gaza will cost at least $18.5bn [1]. (Comparatively, rebuilding Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami cost around $6.7bn).

Clearing the rubble alone may take 21 years since around 69% of Gaza’s structures have been destroyed. Much of it may contain asbestos and definitely does contain human remains - around 10,000 bodies remain under the rubble [2]. Less than a quarter of Gaza’s pre-war water supply is available, and over half of arable land has been (often deliberately) destroyed [3].

As international attention focusses on the tenability of the ceasefire’s second phase and the likelihood of far-right parties forcing Netanyahu to resume the war, it’s important to consider the political and financial machinations concerning rebuilding Gaza. Currently, the third and final phase of the ceasefire is the rebuilding of Gaza under Egyptian, Qatari, and UN supervision. Here, we’ll explore the dangers of Gaza’s reconstruction being hijacked to further vested political (specifically, settler) and financial agendas, both Israeli and American.

Much of Israel’s construction sector is inseparable from its settler politics. This ranges from the government turning a blind eye to illegal settler activity in West Bank to concrete political and financial support for settlement construction companies. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich oversees the Civil Administration, the body that implements Israeli government policy and settlement plans in West Bank. In December, the The Ministry of Settlements and National Mission quietly budgeted $20.5mn for security equipment for “young settlements”, its euphemism for unauthorised and illegal settlements in West Bank [4].

It is highly likely that Israeli settler political and civil blocs will increase their lobbying for the construction of settlements around Gaza. For example, in October, almost a third of Likud lawmakers (Netanyahu’s party) attended a conference organised by the Nachala Movement (a fund supporting young Israeli settlers) named “Preparing to Resettle Gaza” [5]. That a third of Likud, not even the most pro-settler party, should attend illustrates the scale of demand for resettling Gaza.

Civil and political settler advocates see the ceasefire and reconstruction process as an opportunity to reestablish settlements in Gaza, purportedly to prevent Hamas from launching any more attacks from it. The withdrawal of Israeli military and settlers from the Gaza strip in 2005 allowed Hamas to take control of Gaza. This is the strategic argument (and nostalgic emotional tone) of settlers’ calls to resettle Gaza.

Netanyahu has stated that it isn’t official government policy to create settlements in Gaza. Such a policy is a red line for Hamas in negotiations, and would meet significant international opposition, including from Egypt and Qatar who mediate ceasefire and reconstruction negotiations. However, Netanyahu’s political survival depends on Smotrich and the broader settler-extremist far-right political bloc who see civilian and military settlements in Gaza as an absolute security necessity. I think it’s very feasible that Smotrich and his Religious Zionism party would resign and collapse Netanyahu’s tiny two-seat majority and coalition over this.

This isn’t even to mention the Israeli reluctance to exit the Netzarim Corridor.

Moving on from the political pressure for settlements in Gaza, Israeli planners and construction companies leading reconstruction efforts risks them becoming vectors for pro-settler policies in reconstruction. However, even if Israel does not lead it, there will still be massive Israeli obstructions to international aid and charity groups participating in Gaza’s reconstruction.

The expulsion and branding of UNRWA (the largest aid group that was operating in Gaza) as a terrorist group says enough. Instead, a significant part of reconstruction will be performed by private American capital. And with this comes a certain risk of entrenched political and financial interests leeching off Gaza’s reconstruction.

Let’s take a look at two examples: Affinity Partners, and McKinsey.

Affinity Partners is a private investment firm formed in 2021 by Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and senior advisor in his first term. Affinity Partner’s funds are overwhelmingly backed by $2bn from Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund and $1.5bn from the Qatar Investment Authority [6] and Abu Dhabi-based asset manager Lunate [7]. On Friday (17/01/2025), Affinity Partners received approval from Israeli regulators to double its stake in Phoenix Financial Ltd (just hours before the ceasefire deal was formally announced…). Kushner first bought a 4.5% stake valued at $128.5mn in Phoenix Financial Ltd. in July. Since, its share prices have more than doubled to $16.39 a piece [8].

Phoenix Financial Ltd. funds infrastructure and construction projects in illegal Israeli settlements both in West Bank and the Golan Heights. Among other holdings, it has 80% ownership of a mall in the settlement neighbourhood of Ramot in occupied East Jerusalem, its subsidiary Noy 4 Fund is part of a consortium bidding for the construction of railway projects in East Jerusalem, and is the largest shareholder of Z.M.H. Hammerman, an Israeli construction and real estate company that builds commercial and residential properties in settlements in occupied areas. (See [9] for a full description of Phoenix Financial Ltd.’s holdings).

As settlement building is predicted to increase exponentially under Trump (especially after he immediately lifted sanctions on settlers [10]), Kushner is poised to make hundreds of millions of dollars from Phoenix Financial Ltd. I’d also be very unsurprised if Phoenix Financial Ltd. takes part in Gaza’s reconstruction. Perhaps to build the luxury beachfront properties Kushner and Trump have been hinting at since last March… [11]

This is only one example, but a very significant one, of the profits that the Trump cartel is set to make from Gaza’s reconstruction. It also illustrates the financial symbiosis between Israeli corporations, Trump’s administration (and family!), and Gulf States that many political narratives and events relating to these parties in fact supervene on.

So much for Affinity Partners. Now let’s look at McKinsey.

McKinsey partners, Eric Hazan and David Meredith, have committed to becoming part of the Palestinian Reconstruction and Economic Partnership (PREP), a sprawling cooperative private sector initiative for the reconstruction and development of the Gaza strip. Read PREP’s Palestine Emerging initiative for a framework of the reconstruction [11]. (Warning, it’s couched in sickly consultancyspeak: “How do we create the most value for the greatest number of Palestinians?”).

For all the report’s cloying humanitarian wording, this kind of disaster capitalism contains significant profit incentives for private equity involved in reconstruction. There’s so many ways in which this happen, ranging from private ownership of slices of infrastructural projects, to tax exemption on dividends from said profits, to predatory loan conditions to Palestinian borrowers. Looking at some historical examples of private sector disaster management paints a grim outlook.

For example, after Hurricane Maria devastated and bankrupted Puerto Rico’s infrastructural projects, it was forced by US Congress to secede its debt crisis to American debt restructuring bodies rather than default on its debt and enter negotiations itself. Hired by these bodies to help advise them how to restructure Puerto Rico’s debt, McKinsey advised them to award millions of dollars of contracts to LUMA Energy, a joint venture of two North American power companies. While McKinsey was advising the American restructuring bodies to invest in LUMA Energy, one of LUMA Energy’s parent companies was McKinsey’s client. McKinsey was fined $18mn by the Security Exchange Commission for not disclosing this blatant conflict of interest [12]. (See my earlier article about what happens to Ukraine’s natural gas resources for a discussion of how JPMorgan and Blackrock are inserting themselves into Ukraine’s reconstruction).

This kind of inside dealing - where foreign debt restructurers/reconstruction planners hire consultancy firms who recommend foreign private companies in whom either the consultancy firm or restructurers/planners have financial stakes - will very likely feature in Gaza’s reconstruction. While Egyptian military and construction companies will certainly play a role, I expect that American construction firms will lobby for access to reconstruction, whether they’re connected to Trump’s cartel, backed by Gulf equity, or both. Consultancies like McKinsey will rake in consultation profits while their advice has foreign financial interests, rather than Gazans, at heart.

Gaza’s reconstruction is a maze of entrenched political and financial interests. With Smotrich’s position as kingmaker, there will be intense pressure on Netanyahu to insist on Israeli civilian and military settlements in Gaza. I think this has more potential than anything else to finally break his fragile coalition. If Trump refuses to allow settlements in Gaza, the rapid expansion of settlements in West Bank will continue anyway.

Given the financial stakes that the Trump cartel and Gulf states have in Israeli construction companies through investment firms like Affinity Partners, it’s very likely that there’ll be extensive lobbying to give such companies or firms privileged access to Gaza’s reconstruction. Israel will likely resist involvement of international agencies like UNRWA. The cost of reconstruction will be compounded by self-interested consultancy fees by consultancies like McKinsey. All this while Gazans and whichever Palestinian authority is involved are left out of the conversation.

[1] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/04/02/joint-world-bank-un-report-assesses-damage-to-gaza-s-infrastructure

[2] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/1/20/live-palestinian-prisoners-freed-by-israel-after-captives-released-in-gaza

[3] https://www.fao.org/newsroom/story/protecting-livelihoods-and-lives-in-gaza/en

[4] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/israeli-government-quietly-sends-more-than-20-million-to-unauthorized-west-bank-settler-outposts

[5] https://www.timesofisrael.com/it-is-doable-10-likud-mks-to-attend-conference-calling-for-resettling-gaza/

[6] https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-04-11/how-did-jared-kushner-get-2-billion-from-the-saudis?embedded-checkout=true

[7] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-20/jared-kushner-s-affinity-gets-1-5-billion-more-from-qatar-abu-dhabi-s-lunate

[8] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-15/trump-son-in-law-kushner-s-affinity-gets-nod-to-double-stake-in-israeli-firm?embedded-checkout=true

[9] https://www.whoprofits.org/companies/company/7348?the-phoenix-holdings

[10] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250116-trump-administration-to-lift-sanctions-on-israeli-settlers/

[11] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/19/jared-kushner-gaza-waterfront-property-israel-negev

[12]https://palestine-emerging.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/PALESTINE-EMERGING-BLUEPRINT-APRIL-2024-3.pdf

[13] https://www.disruptionbanking.com/2022/12/08/who-benefits-from-the-great-puerto-rican-bond-fraud-energy-fiasco-the-conclusion/

Image sourced from Human Rights Watch 01/04/2014.

On the Dalai Lama’s birthday on 6th July, my sister Kyiga and I went to Boudhanath Stupa (pictured) to celebrate with other Tibetans. Usually, His Holiness’s birthday is one of the biggest and most celebrated occasions of the year. Back home in our refugee settlement in India, festivities and prayer sessions last multiple days. So, Kyiga and I were expecting a fun time.

When we arrived, the square was empty. This is because of Nepal acquiescing to Chinese demands to oppress its Tibetans in return for military investment and training.

Nepal hosts ~12,500 Tibetan refugees, the largest population outside India. Until 1990, it admitted and rehabilitated Tibetans fleeing Chinese invasion in 1949. Around 14,000 Tibetan refugees were naturalised into Nepal and issued Refugee Cards.
Since, however, the Nepali state’s policies towards its Tibetans have become increasingly repressive – paralleling the increasing lawlessness of Nepal’s own police and its exposure to Chinese influence.

After the 2008 Tibetan uprising, the CCP intensified its pressure on Nepal and Nepal began work immediately. An interview in March 2009 quotes the Nepali duty inspector general of police as saying that “[the] Deputy Prime Minister personally…asked me to combat ‘Tibetan independence’ activities… with no reservation and no mercy”.

Now, arbitrary arrest and detention of Tibetans is more common than ever, and Tibetan communities are routinely surveilled and subject to police intimidation. This strategy exists from pressure on local police to vested interests in the highest echelons: the Chinese ambassadors to Nepal following 2008 have included a director and deputy directors of Security Affairs at the Foreign Ministry.

Contravening international law, Nepal deports fleeing Tibetans back to China, insisting they are illegal immigrants instead of refugees. Before 2008, 2,200 Tibetans crossed the border per year on average; in 2013, it was 171. Nepal hasn’t ratified the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees which regulates treatments of refugees under international law.

Since 1990, Tibetans who make it to Nepal are denied Refugee Cards and are officially regarded as “people in transit”. Such status denies Tibetans adequate state-provided healthcare, employment, education, and economic support. It also often traps Tibetans in informal employment sectors, denying them socioeconomic mobility. For example, Boudhanath Stupa is surrounded by at least a hundred informal Tibetan restaurants and souvenir shops.

Tibetans with “people in transit” status are also denied freedom of movement. They must register with the Chief District Officer when changing residence and travelling outside the district they’re registered in. Even Tibetans with a Refugee Card cannot travel outside Nepal without a government-issued exit permit that is only valid for one trip per year to one destination.

Arguably the greatest vector for China’s influence is that China funds Nepal’s police and border force to the tune of millions of dollars. China has even held training camps for Nepal security officials, and has provided Nepal with drone equipment.
This influence drives the police’s brutality and impunity towards Nepalis: a 2020 report found that Nepal’s government failed to implement 87% of recommendations by its National Human Right’s Commission.

Protestors are sweepingly detained, even against Supreme Court release orders. This unimpeachability of Nepal’s police and army undermine its democratic safeguards while opening it to malign Chinese influence.

More broadly, Nepal is torn between India and China, trying to court both. India is by far Nepal’s biggest trading partner (accounting for 80.1% of exports and 60.7% of imports in 2021), and the two have significant cultural ties. As of 2021, 81.2% of Nepalis are Hindu. Nepal uses the same written script as does Hindi.

From what I saw, Indian immigrants are also fairly well-integrated in Nepal and are prevalent in certain service industries, particularly roadside garages/mechanics that cater to cities’ moped delivery fleets.

I also picked up on widespread anti-Chinese sentiment among the many young Nepalis I spoke to. Many viewed Chinese economic ties with suspicion, believing they’d further undercut Nepali industry as Nepal already suffers from record youth unemployment and migration while its goods-and-services sector fails to compensate for its declining agricultural sector.
Other than from the perspective of Nepal’s military-industrial complex, cosying to China makes little political or economic sense.

Once a haven for Tibetans, Nepal has for the past 35 years been pursuing increasingly repressive policies towards its Tibetan refugees. Tibetan political consciousness and organisations meet military and state resistance, and a whole generation of Tibetan refugees are denied even minimal civil rights and official refugee status.

As Nepal’s army becomes increasingly commercially active (for example, planning to revive and operate a textile factory with the help of Chinese investment) and defiant of Nepal’s government and Supreme Court, this vector of malign Chinese influence grows.

It’s in Nepal’s interests to move closer to India, who should specifically increase its foreign investment in Nepal (China is currently Nepal’s greatest source of FDI). There’s little real risk of Tibetan insurgency in Nepal.

Affording Tibetan refugees greater political and socioeconomic rights would go a long way towards improving Nepal’s international reputation and strategic autonomy. Until then, Nepal will remain deeply compromised by Chinese interests and a military less and less constrained by the state.

Article expanded from an Instagram caption I wrote on 22/07/2024 when my siblings and I visited Nepal.

Image sourced from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/picture/2024/dec/18/ben-jennings-elon-musk-nigel-farage-mar-a-lago-donald-trump-cartoon.

Nevermind how ill-informed Musk’s Twitter rampage has been. The attack on Starmer’s handling of grooming gangs has cleverly stoked far-right outrage and added to Starmer’s long list of PR nightmares. Musk’s unexpected tirade against Farage and advocacy for Tommy Robinson has triggered a rally behind Farage, strengthening Reform’s position and letting Farage further distance himself from UKIP. Starmer has missed his golden opportunity to reform political donation laws, letting yet another PR opportunity slip from his hands.

Until their lovers’ tiff yesterday, Musk and Farage seemed to be enjoying something of a honeymoon. The two met in December at Mar-a-Lago for an hour long meeting after which Musk and his father floated the idea of a British branch of Tesla, SpaceX, or X donating $100mn (£85.5mn) to Reform. At Reform’s East Midlands conference, Farage lauded Musk a “hero” and said he was “very pleased he’s backing our party”.

Now, it seems Musk has gone off Farage, in an amusingly one-way breakup after the latter supported Musk’s tirade against Starmer’s handling of grooming gangs. Under Starmer’s tenure as Chief Prosecutor from 2008-2013, there were widespread allegations of police and government failings to properly investigate numerous cases of sexual abuse rings targeting underage girls. Starmer’s government has recently rejected calls for a national inquiry into abuses in Oldham, arguing that there are already multiple local inquiries underway along with a 2022 report whose findings are still being implemented.

I can’t comment on the extent to which the Starmer and the government mishandled investigations. Besides, this isn’t my point. My point is that what makes Musk’s choice of attack so clever is the fact that Pakistani men were the “predominant offenders” (in the words of the 2022 report). Since the cases opened, right-wing media and figures have claimed Starmer and other prosecutors dithered in their investigations for fear of appearing racist. Damningly, Ann Cryer, the Labour MP who first raised concerns about grooming gangs said local authorities “were petrified of being called racist and so reverted to the default of political correctness”.

Musk’s tirade has reawakened these voices and directly plays on these race concerns. Anger isn’t being directed at the fact that hundreds of thousands of girls were abused, but towards the fact that the abusers were foreigners and the idea that the government was too scared to investigate them. Musk has chosen perfect cannon fodder for far-right outrage. His labelling Jess Phillips a “rape genocide apologist” and calling for her to be imprisoned also plays upon the far-right public’s retributive sense of justice. Crazy to me that Twitter political discourse has sunk to this level of vitriol.

Starmer’s alleged shying away from investigating British Muslim communities also highlights the government’s controversial proposal to adopt a formal definition of Islamophobia. Criticism of the proposed bill is most articulately worded by Fiyaz Mughal, founder of Tell Mama which monitors anti-Muslim hate: “Any definition needs to have a number of caveats attached which protect the right of individuals to question religion, to question certain behaviours attached to cultural elements, and the right to have free speech defended in relation to blasphemy”.

This criticism directly extends to sex offences. Critics of Labour’s current working definition of Islamophobia for internal purposes (drafted by the All Party Parliamentary Group of British Muslims) point to one part which appears to state that using the phrase “sex groomer” in relation to a person of Muslim background may be Islamophobic.

Musk’s tirade has directly linked the “scared-to-investigate-Pakistani-rapists” anger with the proposed formal definition of Islamophobia. Conservative MP’s have leapt on this bandwagon. Chris Philp, shadow Home Secretary, tweeted “The reporting on rape gangs this week exposed the conspiracy of silence and cover-up of organised gang rapes because of the identity of most perpetrators, showing how vital it is to be able to speak honestly about all parts of society without fear”.
Liz Truss similarly tweeted “This is @jessphillips, the same Home Office Minister who excused masked Islamist thugs. It’s clear whose side she’s on”.

This puts Starmer in an agonising political position. Trust between Labour and Muslim voters has withered, particularly over high-profile incidents like suspending Zarah Sultana for her outspoken criticism of Israel and voting against the two-child benefit cap. Scrapping plans to adopt a formal definition of Islamophobia would leave Muslims feeling betrayed and exposed to further discrimination. The UK has formally adopted the IHRA’s working definition of antisemitism - one might ask, why not one for Islamophobia? It would also fuel the pattern of Muslim independent MP’s undermining Labour constituencies and policies. Besides, Labour would look weak acquiescing to right-wing pressure.

Adopting the formal definition would further fuel criticism from the Conservative and Reform parties, along with condemnation from American politicians like Musk, and have massive consequences in setting the norm of how Islamophobia is investigated hereafter. There’s a high risk of protracted legal and parliamentary challenges to the definition, too. Labour’s majority would overcome them, but only after bitter political fallout.

On a side-note, Musk’s calls for Farage to be replaced by Rupert Lowe have resulted in Farage gaining more legitimacy. Rupert Lowe himself and other Reform MP’s publicly declared their allegiance to Farage on Twitter. I don’t know whether Musk intended this, but it’s certainly benefited Reform. Musk’s advocacy for Tommy Robinson provides further opportunity for Farage to distance himself from UKIP and accelerate the incorporation of Reform into mainstream politics. Again, bad news for Starmer.

On a second side-note, it now looks much unlikelier that Musk will proceed with his potential $100mn donation to Reform. Starmer’s chance to tighten donation laws (as declared in Labour’s manifesto…) has sailed by. Double gaffe when we remember Starmer accepting over £100k in unregistered donations. Tightening donation laws would have been the perfect repentance. He should have his designer glasses prescription checked so he can see the PR opportunities under his nose.

The recent Twitter wars highlight Starmer’s political minefield of how to engage with Britain’s Muslim communities. Musk has successfully dragged Starmer back into the spotlight at a time when another PR headache is the last thing he needs. The sheer emotiveness of the grooming gangs scandal is perfect fuel for this wave of Starmer criticism. Labour’s PR woes couldn’t be worse.

Image sourced from medyanews.net

The upheaval in Syria following the overthrow of Assad’s regime seems to be stabilising. Significantly, rebel factions have agreed to disband and integrate in a national army under the new Defence Ministry. This was a major strategic goal of al-Shaara (also known by his nom de guerre al-Jolani), the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Syria’s dominant rebel faction. Centralising military equipment aids the rebel factions in suppressing Assad’s remaining forces. It also more importantly greatly limits the possibility of infighting between factions and any in-house insurgency against HTS and the rebel alliance.

However, there was one faction glaringly absent from the agreement: the Democratic Union Party (PYD), Syria’s dominant Kurdish political party. Over Syria’s civil war, the PYD declared an autonomous Kurdish region named Rojava, spanning roughly 19,000 square miles across the Turkey-Syria border. The PYD’s official military wing is the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF’s primary component is the People’s Defence Units (PYG), designated a terrorist organisation by Turkey and Qatar. (Lots of names and structures to keep track of, I know… For the time being, consider the PYD and SDF interchangeable).

Since the civil war began, Ankara has been bombing the SDF (often under the false pretext of bombing ISIS). To Ankara, Kurdish militants on its border is unacceptable. It specifically fears the PYD supporting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which has been conducting insurgency in Turkey over the past forty years and is recognised by Turkey, the US, and the EU as a terrorist organisation. The SDF has received military support from the US for its critical role in suppressing ISIS, but has faced an outright military campaign from Turkey and the Syrian National Army after US withdrawal from the region in 2018.

While HTS claims to be an independent actor, it has long enjoyed Ankara’s military and logistic support. Indeed, advanced drone weaponry provided by Ankara was critical in overthrowing Assad. Many HTS fighters have Turkish origins and some were even photographed hoisting Turkish flags along with the three-starred Syrian revolutionary flag. Turkey is eager to use its influence over HTS; its foreign minister Hakan Fidan was the first foreign minister to visit Damascus since the rebel factions ascendance. During this visit, Fidan stated that Kurdish militants have no place in Syria’s future and called upon the PYG to disband.

Given Ankara’s influence over the HTS, Kurdish absence from the new national army casts uncertainty over the future of Kurdish factions and communities in Syria. Since Assad’s overthrow, Turkey has over the past fortnight launched renewed attacks on Kurdish forces through the Ankara-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). The Kurdish factions’ territorial gains in north-eastern Syria risk being lost and replaced with permanent Turkish military outputs. al-Jolani may push for the PYD to reach some kind of demilitarisation agreement with Turkey, as a precondition for entering the rebel administration. However, if ISIS experiences a resurgence in north-eastern Syria, there may not be room for demilitarisation.

The PYD is in a weak strategic position. With ISIS no longer the potent threat it was under Biden and Trump’s first administration, the SDF cannot rely on this reason for American support. Trump also recently stated that Turkey “holds the key” to Syria, indicating a limited American desire to restrain Turkey.True, the SDF joining Syria’s new national army would show it will not militarily act against HTS. But it cannot relinquish its weapons in the face of Turkish attacks in north-eastern Syria. Moreover, it would be unwise to join without the HTS declaring a concrete Kurdish policy.

Distancing itself from the PKK would be a major demonstration of goodwill towards Turkey that is worth suffering resentment from nationalistic Kurds. Indeed, the PYD must try to rein in the PKK from committing more attacks in Turkey like the October attack in Ankara that killed five and injured twenty-two. Such attacks would fuel Turkey’s border paranoia. The PYD must also present a united front with other Kurdish political groups, especially with Syria’s Kurdish National Council which has ties to Turkey and the ruling party in Iraqi Kurdistan. International Kurdish coordination would greatly increase the PYD’s legitimacy in negotiations.

The new rebel administration seeks to portray itself as independent and secular, acting on behalf of all Syrians free from entrenched interests. A significant part of this is its promise to protect Syria’s minorities. The protests incited by the recent burning of a Christmas tree, interpreted as an insult to Syria’s Druze Christian minority, has drawn international attention to precisely this. For the rebel alliance, resisting Turkey’s anti-Kurdish influence would significantly reassure the international community of its strategic independence and commitment to protecting its minorities.

Kurds comprise 10% of Syria’s population and are the Middle East’s fourth-largest ethnic group. They and their unique culture and nomadic traditions have been enmeshed in the Middle East’s fabric for thousands of years. Positive political and social progress in Syria – and the Middle East at large – cannot be achieved without meaningful inclusion of its Kurds.

Also, drop a like or comment if you enjoyed - helps me see engagement and push the ting.

Image sourced from Christopher Michel, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons; edited by me.

The recent media controversy around the Dalai Lama asking a young boy to suck his tongue is as ignorant as it is pernicious.

As a Tibetan, I can vouch that Tibetan elders often jokingly use that phrase with little ones - after they've pestered you into giving them all you have to offer, you exasperatedly tell them, "eat/suck my tongue" because it's all you have left.

​

Sucking is heavily sexualised in Western media and culture, but its Tibetan counterpart has no such meaning. However, not one of the mainstream news-sources I cited gave this crucial Tibetan perspective and explanation. The ones that did mention Tibetan traditions used them as strawmen and darkly commented that they had no mention of sucking.

​

I believe that this complete cultural ignorance allowed the media to cram this event into the culturally-embedded prism of sexual abuse by religious leaders. Sex scandals sell, especially when the Dalai Lama is the perpetrator.

Thus I believe that this event sheds light not on the Dalai Lama but rather the salacious profiteering marketing of the Western media.

Read the full article here

That these countries have committed multiple war-crimes in Afghanistan and Somalia is indisputable. But what is less well-documented are the legal, political, and diplomatic acrobatics they have done to suppress inquiry and escape accountability.

From years-long smear-campaigns against journalists, to brazenly dismantling investigative bodies and other checks and balances, to Canadian officials caught stuffing documents in a bag to be burned, this paper eviscerates the idea that these governments and militaries even remotely abided by the international rules of war during these campaigns.

Instead, it illuminates the underbelly of wartime and how the entire military apparatus, from soldiers on the ground to government lawyers in courtrooms, are ruled by cultures of machismo, unimpeachability, and self-preservation.

​

Hailed by AOAV as "a must-read for policymakers, legal experts, and anyone interested in understanding the complexities of military operations and international law", and making "a significant contribution to the field of military ethics and international law", this is the pinnacle of my journalistic work thus far.

Read full paper here:

Image sourced from CNBC, via NBC News.

The usual well-worn themes of democracy and territorial integrity sometimes obscure the strategic interests that the West has in safeguarding Ukrainian independence. One of the underdiscussed strategic interests is Ukraine’s energy supplies, and in particular, its abundance of natural gas. In 2018 Ukraine was ranked as the 26th most abundant country in the world for natural gas, and possesses Europe’s second-largest reserves, as well as its most extensive transport system.

Made by purifying natural gas and super-cooling it to -162°, liquid natural gas (LNG) is both vital for transitioning to green energy and also a superior fuel to oil and natural gas, producing up to 80% less emissions than oil and being 600 times denser than natural gas.

This is especially true when the global oil demand hit a record 103m bpd[1] (barrels per day) in June while global oil supplies are simultaneously pinched – not least by crafty supply-side manoeuvring by Saudi Arabia and OPEC allies (check my article on this for more).

Since the war and ensuing embargoes on imports of Russian oil and natural gas, everyone is scrambling for LNG. Broadly, two main currents define this scramble; a surge in supply from Qatar and UAE, and a surge in supply from America. America became the world’s top exporter of LNG in the first half of 2022, and has since been surpassed by Qatar; in July, Qatar Energy reported[2] $41.5bn profit, a 58% rise from 2022.

Assuming an eventual Russian withdrawal from Ukraine, Ukraine has the potential to be a major LNG source for central and eastern Europe, both in storage and exports. Ukraine already has Europe’s largest unused underground gas storage (UGS) capacity; 13 underground facilities have a total working capacity of 30.9bcm[3], an entire tenth of Europe’s 343bcm natural gas consumption in 2021. Utilising this storage is in EU interests, especially as doubts grow over whether Ukraine will remain a conduit for Russian gas past 2024 – Ukrainian Energy Minister, German Galuschenko, said[4] in August that Ukraine will not negotiate extending the current contract which supplies Europe with 10bcm. UGS does much to solidify Europe’s natural gas security and allow for rapid and flexible regional distribution.

Ukraine’s potential as a LNG exporter is particularly salient for eastern European countries such as Moldova, who relies on Russian gas but suffers from Russian bullying; Moldova has extended its contract with Gazprom until 2026, but was threatened by Gazprom in late 2022 to pay the $73mil it owed within 48hours or Gazprom would cut off supply.

No wonder that Moldova could benefit from Ukrainian gas, and it has already begun storing gas in its UGS[5]. However, Ukraine’s true potential lies in its ability to export further westwards.

The recently completed Poland-Lithuania and Poland-Slovakia[6] pipelines allow transfer of re-gasified LNG between the countries and Ukraine. The ability to supply Poland is especially desirable for Ukraine, given Poland’s ambitions in becoming a supplier of Germany. Polish multinational, PKN Orlen, took over the Polish state-controlled oil and gas company, PGNiG, in 2022 – after already acquiring the main oil and gas subsidiaries of the Czech Republic and Lithuania. Orlen is looking to buy[7] stakes in Germany’s Schwedt Refinery, which supplies the bulk of Berlin’s fuel. This venture into German markets extends to gas as well as oil.

Not only have the Poland-Lithuania and Poland-Slovakia pipelines been completed but, aligning with the EU framework of the North-South gas corridor spanning the Central and Eastern European region, Poland and Ukraine have in March signed a long-term pledge[8] to integrate their gas transmission systems. This would enable direct gas flow[9] between Poland’s Świnoujście LNG terminal and Ukraine, via Orlen subsidiaries, and then could be transported by Orlen to east Germany.

Orlen pledges to invest 320bn zloty, equivalent to $78bn, in expansion over this decade, with CEO Daniel Obajtek expressing[10] a special interest in “increasining the number of gas stations in the regions to boost our competitiveness”. Thus emerges the concrete possibility of a centrally-placed Poland being able to supply Ukrainian natural gas to Germany and regional neighbours.

Germany itself has been aware of this, sniffing around Ukraine’s natural gas reserves even before invasion. The Joint Statement of the United States and Germany on Support for Ukraine, European Energy Security, and our Climate Goals[11], released in July 2021, included a joint pledge to support investments of at least $1bn in a Green Fund. Germany provided the initial $175mn upfront donation to the fund. Most saliently, it also explicitly mentioned efforts to integrate Ukrainian natural gas supplies into the European market. Ukraine’s potential is not new news, and talk should become action.

Germany is currently scrambling for LNG suppliers, building two floating LNG terminals in under one year – its first LNG terminals ever, since its infrastructure was crafted around a dependance on Russian supplies. Buying LNG from exporters such as Qatar is not a panacea for various reasons. Qatar wants long-term contracts, such as[12] the 15-year one agreed with Germany, and this is at odds with Germany’s targets to reduce LNG consumption. Also, Qatar will sell the gas to the American company, Conoco Phillips, who will then ship it to the LNG terminal in Brunsbüttel. Much more flexible and effective to seek to source Ukrainian gas via Poland on shorter-term contracts.

Of course, much has to be done before Ukraine can be a supplier of LNG to Europe – least of all a Russian withdrawal. Market-wise, Ukraine’s gas market has historically been unamenable to private investment, with state-owned Naftogaz controlling 75% of it. Granted, Ukraine began restructuring its gas market between 2014-2015[13]; in 2015, it adopted a natural gas market law with reforms aligned to the EU’s third energy package that set the foundations to liberalise the gas sector and allow third-party access to transportation, storage, and distribution. However, these initiatives were rolled back during wartime. Also, much of Ukraine’s natural gas infrastructure was built in the Soviet era and sorely needs modernisation estimated to cost $10bn over 10-15 years.

Yet, the beginnings are there, and with the political and economic will this process can be much accelerated. It is in the interest of Zelenskyy and central and eastern European energy security that Ukraine’s natural gas capacity be harnessed. When Ukraine’s trade is built back up after the war, its extensive natural gas infrastructure and supplies should be tailored towards greater European integration. This integration should utilise pre-existing pipelines between Ukraine, Poland, and other central and eastern European states to take advantage of their shared interests in placing the region’s gas supplies on its own soil and under its own control.

Crucially, this must be done under Ukrainian control and for Ukrainian interests. As countless historical examples from post-Allende Chile to Suharto's Indonesia show, opening up a country's resources to private investment can swiftly make it beholden to rapacious multinationals that exploit them without a care for the natives nor environment.

Blackrock and JPMorgan are the two investment funds in charge of the fund to rebuild Ukraine after the war, seeking to start a development finance bank to usher in private investments. To what extent actual Ukrainians will be shareholders in these development projects is a pertinent question; indeed, the country's institutional and endemic corruption leads me to think that corrupt businessmen and elites will prostitute Ukraine's development to foreign entities to line their pockets.

That is, if even they have a say - to overcome investor concerns about governance, "the fund is expected to stock its board with representatives of international financial institutions and governments and hire investment professionals to execute its strategy"[14]. Put otherwise, the fund will be institutionally configured as to place all executive power in private hands.

It is likely that this rapaciousness and disempowerment of Ukrainians will extend to Ukraine's energy sector - care must be taken to ensure that it is Ukraine, not others, that is in charge of its energy.

[1] https://www.ft.com/content/6f83ed81-28a5-46e9-98c4-a2bcf3d5b9fc

[2] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/qatar-energy-reports-58-jump-annual-profit-2022-4247-billion-2023-07-18/

[3] https://www.csis.org/analysis/role-gas-ukraines-energy-future

[4] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/ukraine-has-no-plans-talk-with-russia-gas-transit-contract-renewal-voa-2023-08-17/

[5] https://www.csis.org/analysis/role-gas-ukraines-energy-future

[6] https://www.pipeline-journal.net/news/construction-poland-slovakia-gas-pipeline-completed-operations-begin-oct-2022

[7] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-03/poland-s-orlen-lays-out-red-lines-for-buying-stake-in-german-schwedt-refinery

[8] https://ceenergynews.com/oil-gas/ukraine-and-poland-sign-gas-transmission-system-integration-agreement/#:~:text=Ukraine%20and%20Poland%20sign%20gas%20transmission%20system%20integration%20agreement,-By%20Filip%20Derewenda&text=Poland's%20GAZ%2DSYSTEM%20and%20Ukraine's,on%20Thursday%20(16%20March).

[9] https://www.energy-community.org/regionalinitiatives/infrastructure/PLIMA/Gas14.html

[10] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-03/poland-s-orlen-lays-out-red-lines-for-buying-stake-in-german-schwedt-refinery

[11] https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-united-states-and-germany-on-support-for-ukraine-european-energy-security-and-our-climate-goals/

[12] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/29/germany-agrees-15-year-liquid-gas-supply-deal-with-qatar

[13] https://www.csis.org/analysis/role-gas-ukraines-energy-future

[14] https://www.ft.com/content/3d6041fb-5747-4564-9874-691742aa52a2

Image taken from theprint.in 2018

Introduction

Tibet is the climate epicentre of the world. Situated on the Tibetan plateau, the highest on earth, it contains the largest reserves of freshwater outside of the Poles. Each of Asia’s ten major river systems originate in the Tibetan plateau, and billions of people depend on Tibet’s waters for their survival. The cyclical heating of the Tibetan plateau is a driving force of Indian monsoons[1], and its snow cover has been shown to contribute to heatwaves as far as Europe and North America[2]. Tibet’s climate plays a key role in regulating that of Asia and of the wider world.

Yet, Tibet is suffering the fastest global warming anywhere in the world, three times faster than the global average[3]. Over 6,000 of its glaciers have disappeared in the past fifty years, and its snow cover is rapidly shrinking. This is already having catastrophic results in the regions downstream. The number of floods in India rose from 67 to 90 between 2006-2015, a steep rise of 34% in less than a decade[4]. The impact is most severe in Pakistan, where floods from the Indus River which originates in Tibet have affected 30 million people and killed over 1,000 since June alone.

China has been rapidly building dams on Tibetan rivers since it invaded in 1949. It has built hundreds across Tibet and 11 on the Mekong River since 1995[5], and plans to create the world’s largest dam on the Brahmaputra River. More than 50,000 dams have been built on the Yangtze River, Tibet's largest and the third-largest in the world, since 1950 alone. Chinese damming of Tibet’s rivers poses massive threats to not just Tibet’s water security and local population, but that of the Asian continent.
Furthermore, it has significant geopolitical implications, giving China enormous strategic advantages over its neighbours in a time where water security is increasingly under threat, and is fuelling a water arms race between it and India, the two biggest powers in the Asian continent. No environmental narrative is complete without the recognition of Tibetan climate change, and this paper seeks to reveal its scale, causes, and effects, and recommend policies that the Asian and international community should take to halt its devastating effects.

Why China is damming Tibet

China has severe water problems. This year it recorded its highest temperatures ever, and average rainfall fell 23% to 82mm, the third-lowest since records began in 1961[6]. The heatwave between mid-June to the end of August was the “most severe” since records began, in terms of duration, extent, intensity, and impact. It has caused widespread droughts and agricultural crises with 2.2 million hectares of agricultural land across six provinces being affected. An estimated 70% of China’s population relies on groundwater as its source of drinking water[7], yet over 50% of its rivers are too polluted to be drinkable. Its supplies of drinking water are also facing severe shortages.

As well as facing agricultural and drinking water crises, China’s energy production is being weakened. As the drought dries up rivers, hydropower generation is rapidly dwindling. Sichuan, one of the areas suffering drought, produces 30% of China’s hydropower[8] – yet its hydropower production has plummeted by more than 50%, and will only dwindle further as the drought continues. As hydropower decreases and Chinese energy demand rises amidst an effort to revitalise its staggering manufacturing-and-export-based economy, China is forced to use more coal. In a direct response to the energy crunch caused by the droughts, power plants burned 15% more thermal coal each day for the first two weeks of August compared to last year[9]. However, given that the droughts are a direct effect of China’s use of fossil fuels, this is a short-term fix that will only compound the deeper problem.

Worse still, China’s uneven resource distribution further exacerbates the problem. 80% of water is concentrated in South China[10] while its northern and eastern regions require urgent supplies. The northern regions due to their aridity, housing the Gobi and Taklamakan Deserts, and the eastern regions due to their roles as the powerhouses of China’s economy. As the northern regions become increasingly dry and the eastern regions seek to boost production, China will need to divert water to those regions.

The local effects and future risks

For these difficulties in irrigation, drinking water, and hydropower, China plans to exponentially increase damming and has turned to Tibet to fulfil its water needs. As of 2020, China has dammed every major river on the Tibetan Plateau, including the Mekong, the Brahmaputra, the Yangtze, and the Indus[11]. More than 50,000 dams have been built on the Yangtze River alone since 1950[12].

These dams have devastating effects on the local Tibetan climate and people. The CCP has given the green-light for the construction of the Longpan dam that will alone forcibly displace an estimated 100,000 Tibetans and other ethnic minorities[13]. This is part of a massive campaign of forcibly displacing nomads from their ancestral lands to make way for industrial projects – China has forcibly displaced over 1 million nomads since the 1990’s alone, which is equivalent to an entire sixth of the Tibetan population[14].

The construction of these dams often causes landslides and floods that damage, largely irreversibly, Tibetan landscapes and communities. In 2016, China constructed a hydropower station on Boluo area of the Yangtze River. A mere two years later, the area was hit by two landslides in three weeks, causing the evacuation of 30,000 thousand people and the total devastation and flooding of the township. Chinese negligence was present even in the response to the catastrophe – China took six days to send machinery to remove earth from the landslide[15].

This occurred on an even worse scale in Sichuan. In 2008, an 8.0 magnitude earthquake killed 88,000 people and left millions homeless. Multiple Chinese and international studies[16] concluded that the 320 million tonnes of water in the Zipingpu Reservoir just 5.5km from the earthquake’s centre was the cause. However, Wang Ziaofeng, director of the State Council’s Three Gorges Project Construction Committee, the committee in charge of the reservoir’s creation, dismissed the results of the studies and did not implement any review or change to the dam’s operations[17].

Little wonder, then, that a 7.0 magnitude earthquake occurred again in the region in 2017[18], as a direct cause of Chinese officials’ complacency and cost-cutting. These seismic risks do not just extend to these two examples. A 2012 study by Probe International found that 99.7% of Chinese dams in Tibet are located in zones of moderate to very heigh seismic hazard[19]. Essentially every one of China’s dams is a severe earthquake risk.

The downstream effects and future risks

As well as damaging Tibet’s climate, damming harms downstream countries too. The Mekong River provides a stark example of this. The Mekong River is home to the largest inland fishery in the world, accounting for an estimated 25% of global freshwater catches[20], but its fish population has plummeted. An Giang in Vietnam, the first and main distributary of the Mekong, lost over 80% of freshwater fish catches between 2000-2020 – more than 76,100 tonnes, equivalent to the average fish consumption of 3.7 million people in a year[21].

Studies show that China’s Lancang Cascade (the six main upstream dams on the Mekong) have caused “significant alteration of the flow regimes and reduction of the sediment load of the lower Mekong River”[22], trapping as much as 83%[23] of the sediment generated from the upper Mekong River Basin – some studies[24] predict that only 4% of the Mekong River’s sediment would reach the delta annually if all planned 133 dams are constructed in the future.

Similar things are happening to the Yangtze River. The Yangtze is China’s biggest freshwater fishery, but since the Three Gorges Dam, the largest dam in the world, was completed in 2012 the downstream population of carp has fallen by 90%[25]. Fish is a significant part of diets across China, with 42% of its population eating it regularly, and China is expected to account for 38% of global fish consumption by 2030[26]. Chinese damming is not only affecting the diets of downstream countries, but also its own.

Damming also causes increased flood risk for downstream countries. The Brahmaputra is the largest river in India and the ninth largest in the world, and is crucial for the livelihoods of over 130 million people in the regions of China, India, and Bangladesh it flows through. However, it is posing an increasingly great danger to its downstream countries. Tibetan glacial melt is occurring fastest in Tibet’s south-eastern regions, the same regions which contribute most to the feeding of the Brahmaputra[27].

In 2014, China constructed its first dam on the Brahmaputra, sparking public outcry from India and Bangladesh at having been misled as to its size[28], and plans to build four more[29]. In the face of increasingly rapid melting of the glaciers that feed the Brahmaputra, these dams are going to rapidly increase its water levels, creating immense water pressure on the dams and exponentially increasing the risks of floods. The Brahmaputra’s levels have already been rising rapidly, with Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, the first areas it enters in India, seeing daily rises of 10-20 inches since July 2021[30]. This poses catastrophic risks of flooding for India and Bangladesh, and endangers the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of millions.

China has also mentioned plans to redivert the Brahmaputra’s waters to create a “western route” for its South-to-North Water Diversion Project. India’s total water demand is expected to rise by over 70% by 2025, and this would not only cause grave flood risks at the points of the river at which the water is diverted, but would also deprive India of the water it needs to sustain itself[31].

Despite the legitimate concerns of its neighbours about the massive threats that China’s water policy poses to them, China has not shared its water but has continued to hoard it. The Mekong River experienced a severe drought in 2019, with its water levels running so low that irrigation pumps could not reach it[32]. At first, the Mekong River Commission put this down to low rainfall induced by climate change[33] - China, a “dialogue member” of the commission, did nothing to correct this explanation.

However, a study[34] by US-based climate consultant, Eyes on Earth, used satellite analysis to show that the headwaters and upper reaches of the Mekong, respectively located in Tibet and China, had an overabundance of water. Using its dams, China had taken the Mekong's water for itself and left the lower reaches of the Mekong to dry. Earth Eye’s data has been described as “beyond reproach”[35] and is clear evidence of Chinese hoarding of water at the expense of downstream countries.

More than hoarding water, China has actively weaponised it as an instrument of punishment. The Doklam crisis was a military standoff that occurred in 2017 wherein China sought to extend a road into Doklam, a disputed territory that China claims as its own and India and Bhutan claim as Bhutan’s. The dispute ended with both sides withdrawing their troops and China undoing its construction of the road. The resolution of the crisis was seen as a diplomatic victory for India and a loss of face for China[36], prompting anger in Beijing.

It is thus no surprise that during the peak flood season, which coincided with the height of the standoff, China shared hydrological data with Bangladesh[37] but not India[38], leaving it unprepared for massive flooding of the Brahmaputra that killed 85 people and left over half a million homeless[39]. As the frequency of flooding rises, China’s using hydrological information as political tit-for-tat becomes an increasingly serious danger to downstream countries.

The Mekong and Brahmaputra are just two examples which illustrate the dangers of Chinese damming. With this in mind, China’s ambitions to build the world’s largest dam over the Brahmaputra are terrifying. Even though construction of the new dam is not yet completed, China already owns the world’s biggest dam, the Three Gorges Dam. The planned dam will produce over triple the electricity the Three Gorges Dam does[40]. Construction is already underway[41].

This dam, as do all dams in Tibet, damages not just Tibet’s climate but also its cultural heritage. Both the native pre-Buddhist religion in Tibet, the Bon religion, and Tibetan Buddhism contain a wide pantheon of deities and, given Tibet’s abundance of rivers, water deities are often the most revered of them. The Yarlung Tsangpo is among Tibet’s most culturally significant rivers, representing the body of Dorje Phagmo, one of the highest incarnations in Tibetan Buddhism. Respect of rivers is a fundamental cornerstone of Tibetan culture, and Tibetans would never fish or dump waste and excrement in them out of reverence for water deities.

Given the significance of Tibetan rivers in Tibetan culture, Chinese damming of the Yarlung Tsangpo and other rivers is the destruction of one of Tibet’s most precious cultural sites. As well as China’s widescale destruction of Tibetan monasteries, its destruction to Tibetan environment and therefore its culture is what is meant by the “cultural genocide” occurring in Tibet. Tibetan geography is inseparable from Tibetan culture, and thus Chinese environmental destruction of Tibet not only damages the land but the very identity of the Tibetan people.

Apart from the local damage the dam will do to Tibet’s climate, community, and culture, the risks the dam already posed to downstream countries will massively skyrocket and escalate tensions between China and India. In response, India plans to build a dam of its own on the Brahmaputra in retaliation. This will be India’s second-biggest dam and could spark a water arms race between the two superpowers with disastrous effects for the region.

Current policy and policy solutions

Unless China comes to a multilateral agreement with downstream states over water distribution and damming, Chinese damming will not be curbed and will continue to endanger hundreds of millions of people. However, historically, China has proven itself to be disinclined towards cooperation. It was one of three countries to vote against the UN Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses[42].
It has also, as shown with India, shown that it is willing to use its hydrological data as a means of political retaliation, as well as misleading other countries with false details of its dam projects. This seriously undermines trust between China and its downstream neighbours, and allows China to act in a unilateral and unchecked manner. Legally binding multilateral agreements with downstream countries are crucial in ensuring China’s legitimacy and the fairness and sustainability of regional water distribution.

In fairness, China has taken some steps towards this. Despite China breaking it in not sharing hydrological data with India in 2017, China and India signed a MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) with India in 2002[43] in which China swore to provide India with hydrological data in the Brahmaputra’s flood season. The two countries also signed a separate MOU on “Strengthening Cooperation on Trans-Border Rivers” in 2013 which the scope for sharing hydrological information of three separate hydrological stations was enhanced[44].
A need for a trans-border cooperation for an early warning system for the Sutlej River was felt by India in 2004, and so they also signed a specific MOU in 2005[45] wherein China swore to provide India with hydrological information on the Sutlej. It has been renewed twice, with China keeping its word. China should also allow India to inspect and research its dams on the Brahmaputra to allay its fears, and actively help them facilitate this.

In the face of severe mistrust between India and China, MOU’s like these have the potential to rebuild trust and cooperation between the nations. It is in the interests of both China and India to create more in the future.

China has also signed a 2019 MOU with Myanmar which included water resource development strategic policy and plans, multi-purpose management cooperation in water resources, management of natural disasters such as flooding and drought, assessment and prediction of water data, water resource management, and technological training. Given that the Mekong River also flows through Myanmar, this seems like an important and encouraging step in cooperation.

Yet, there have been concerns that China is guilty of hypocrisy in its water policies towards Myanmar[46]. Citing earthquakes and environmental concerns, China suspended all of its projects on the Salween River which flows through its southwest and Myanmar’s east. Environmentalists praised this as a majorly progressive step for the CCP, since it was the first time that the government‘s Five Year National Energy Plan had excluded all 13 dam projects on the Salween.

However, while China stopped dam-building on its side of the Salween, it had been pushing Aung San Su Kyi’s new and inexperienced government to continue with five mega-dam projects approved by Myanmar’s previous regime. Two Chinese corporations, the Three Gorges Corporation and Sinohydro, have significant financial stakes in the dam, and under the terms of the agreement, 90% of its generated electricity would flow to China and Thailand. The seismic fault lines that China cited as its reason for stopping damming in China continue down into Myanmar, and so Myanmar faces the exact same risks that made China halt construction on its side of the Mekong.

While China was lobbying Aung San Su Kyi’s new government to construct the dams, it had simultaneously not given Myanmar’s Ministry of Energy or the Myanmar Earthquake Committee any warning of the dams’ potential earthquake risks. This is a stark example of how these MOU’s can pay only lip-service to environmental regulations while masking selfish and anti-environmental motives, and other signatories to the deals must ensure that China complies with the spirit, as well as the letter, of its policies.

A similar tension arises in the Lancang Mekong Cooperation Forum. The LMC is a multilateral format between China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam that was established by China in 2016. Its five priority areas are (i) regional connectivity, (ii) industrial cooperation, (iii) cross-border economic cooperation, (iv) water resources management, and (v) agriculture cooperation and poverty reduction. The voluntary establishment of a multilateral framework is an unusual step for China, and could be viewed in a positive light as signs the country desires to accommodate the interests of its downstream neighbours. The LMC has made progress in several areas, such as achieving two-way power transmission between China and Laos for the first time, and in the transparent sharing of hydrological information.

However, it is not legally binding and there already exist legally binding agreements between the other members that China can join rather than creating its own. In light of this, it is tempting to see the LMC as another attempt by China to pay lip-service to environmentalism and equitable distribution, and to use concerns of sovereignty to block any external powers from monitoring its activity under the LMC.

It is also important to understand LMC as an extension of the wider Belt and Road Initiative, and therefore the dangers of economic coercion and debt traps it poses. For example, Laos is teetering on the edge of defaulting on its debts to China. AidData Lab at the College of William and Mary[47] tracks debt for China’s BRI projects and found that the total value of Laos’ public debt to China is $12.2 billion – 63% of the country’s entire GDP. Laos’ indebtedness to China can very feasibly translate into it making concessions to China within the LMC. Similarly, China is Myanmar’s biggest trade partner in both import and exports, accounting for over 30% of its trade. Given this, the signatories to the LMC must recognise their susceptibility to the related economic pressures they are under from China, and navigate it carefully and with open eyes.

China must join legally-binding and internationally-monitored water distribution agreements. A powerful way to ensure that China abides by fair principles of water distribution is to appoint extra-regional nations with no interest in the dams to oversee the enforcement of agreements – an example of this could be appointing a relatively neutral country like Kiribati to oversee the implementation of the LMC. It would also greatly increase trust between China and its downstream neighbours if China were to make the LMC and its MOU’s legally binding – they are currently non-binding and as such have very limited effectiveness and are essentially rhetorical.

There are already aforementioned legally binding initiatives that China can join such as the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for Sustainable Development in the Mekong River Basin which has substantive rules regarding equitable utilisation, due diligence not to cause human or environmental harm, and information sharing. China is not party to the 1995 agreement, nor to the commission overseeing its implementation, the Mekong River Commission, preferring instead to engage from a distance as a legally non-binding “dialogue partner”.[48] China should join the 1995 and the MRC, which can be amended to include Chinese interests – doing so would be a significant step in showing that it is serious about equitable water distribution and mitigating environmental concerns.

Regarding Tibet, China should immediately curb its industrial activity that is causing accelerated glacial melt, floods, and landslides that devastate Tibet’s climate and communities, and downstream parts of India and indeed China itself. Specifically, it should seek to rapidly curb the activity of its dams and hydrological power stations in order to mitigate the myriad risks they pose.

China should also halt construction of its second dam on the Brahmaputra and find alternate means of generating power and providing water to its dryer regions. The former could include, but is not limited to, increasing solar and wind power use and facilities, especially in China’s hot and gusty deserted regions, upgrading existing power infrastructure to make it more efficient, and imposing regulations on excessive and wasteful power consumption such as when it turned off Shanghai’s famous decorative lights for two days[49].

The latter could include, but is not limited to, upgrading China’s inefficient water infrastructure, continuing to use measures such as the artificial rain production it used to combat August’s droughts[50], and cleaning up China’s already existing water supplies. This last measure is of particular importance, given that more than half of China’s rivers are too polluted to serve as sources of drinking water[51] yet 70% of Chinese use groundwater as their source of drinking water.

To give it alternatives to dam-building, China must boost national and international investment in domestic water infrastructure. This and all of the above could be facilitated by opening these initiatives up to private and foreign investment on a case-by-case basis, and loosening the CCP’s protectionist public services model. In parallel to this, it could seek to eliminate some of the cumbersome bureaucracy that is an inevitable effect of having these initiatives under state control and decentralise some initiatives to local governments, while still ensuring transfer of data and communication between them.

China should also actively encourage and facilitate international monitoring of Tibetan climate change, and seek maximum transparency in the publication and availability of data regarding it. Given the global effects of Tibetan climate change, China should enter into scientific and policy dialogue with the international community to mitigate its effects. Crucially, it should also include Tibetan researchers who understand their land and the threats to it better than anyone, and can give key on-the-ground insights and solutions.

As well as this, China should compensate the Tibetan people for the destruction it has done to their lands and way of life. Even though it will never be enough to replace the priceless damage it has done, the millions of Tibetans who have been forcibly displaced or otherwise affected by the CCP’s industrial activity should be given financial compensation and local investment. China should also begin concerted efforts to clean up Tibet, particularly in sites such as disused mines where industry is non-active but its remnants are still damaging the environment.

China has set goals to boost its non-pumped hydro energy storage capacity (hydroelectric dams count as this) to around 30GW by 2025 and 100GW by 2030 – a more than 3000% increase from 3.3GW in 2020[52]. The sheer scale of China’s hydrological ambition underscores the imperative of curbing it and the dangers of it continuing unchecked.

Conclusion

Chinese industrial activity in Tibet has devastating consequences for both it and the rest of the world. Its dams have already caused irreparable environmental damage and loss of life to Tibetans, Chinese, Indians, and all other groups in the basins of Tibet’s rivers across Asia. Tibet’s glaciers are rapidly melting and when, not if, they flood, Chinese dams downstream are not only already weakening the riverbanks but are also going to channel the floods into even more forceful torrents and exacerbate their catastrophic impact on the billions who live alongside and rely upon Tibet’s waters.

To avoid irreparably damaging Asia’s water security, China must curb its rapacious damming and work with the international community to engage in legally binding agreements that set out equitable distribution and sustainable management of Asia’s rivers. It must also accept responsibility for the damage it has so far caused, and work with the local and national governments of the affected areas to enact reparations and seek to repair what it can of the harm it has done, not least to the Tibetan people and their land.

Given their global significance, Tibet’s climates and especially its rivers are arguably the most pressing environmental concern our planet and species is facing, and no attempt to address climate change is complete without it.

[1] https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/the-tibetan-plateau-and-the-indian-monsoon/article4651084.ece

[2] https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00382-015-2775-y#page-1

[3] https://www.google.com/search?q=global+warming+tibet+three+times+faster+global+average&oq=global+warming+tibet+three+times+faster+global+average&aqs=chrome..69i57j33i160l4.14857j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#:~:text=Tibetan%20plateau%20faces,climate%20%E2%80%BA%20tibetan%2Dplateau%2D...

[4] https://e360.yale.edu/features/as-the-monsoon-and-climate-shift-india-faces-worsening-floods

[5] https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/energy/what-are-the-impacts-of-dams-on-the-mekong-river/

[6] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/07/china-reports-most-severe-heatwave-and-lowest-rainfall-on-record

[7] https://www.chinawaterrisk.org/resources/analysis-reviews/groundwater-under-pressure/#:~:text=Over%20400%20of%20the%20655,and%2086%25%20of%20coal%20reserves.

[8] https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/sichuan-china-drought-heat-power-crunch-eases-2905426#:~:text=Sichuan%20generates%2030%20per%20cent,minimal%20rainfall%20and%20extreme%20heat.

[9] https://time.com/6210204/china-drought-coal-climate-goals/

[10] https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0006f7fe-fcdd-415d-874c-bbb7237bebf1

[11] https://tibetpolicy.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Tib.-Env.-Perspective..pdf

[12] https://www.wwf.org.uk/where-we-work/places/yangtze

[13] https://savetibet.org/damming-tibets-rivers-new-threats-to-tibetan-area-under-unesco-protection/

[14] https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/opinion/the-price-of-damming-tibets-rivers.html#:~:text=The%20damming%20does%20not%20benefit,are%20prohibited%20or%20violently%20dispersed.

[15] https://tibet.net/unchecked-construction-could-have-triggered-recent-jomda-landslide-flooding-in-tibet-zamlha-tempa-gyaltsen-tibet-policy-institute/

[16] https://journal.probeinternational.org/2008/12/01/integrated-analysis-stress-and-regional-seismicity-surface-loading-case-study-zipingpu-reservoir/

[17] https://journal.probeinternational.org/2009/03/18/three-gorges-chief-rejects-scientific-link-between-sichuan-quake-and-zipingpu-reservoir/ [

18] https://journal.probeinternational.org/2017/08/30/once-again-sichuan-quake-highlights-dam-risk/

[19] https://tibetpolicy.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Tib.-Env.-Perspective..pdf

[20] https://theaseanpost.com/article/damming-mekong-environmental-hell

[21] https://earthjournalism.net/stories/mekong-fishermen-struggle-to-survive

[22] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0169555X19305021

[23] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0169555X19305021#bb0095

[24] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0169555X19305021#bb0095

[25] https://tibet.net/the-price-of-damming-tibets-rivers/

[26] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352513421000247

[27] https://tc.copernicus.org/articles/14/2267/2020/

[28] https://reliefweb.int/report/india/china-builds-hydroelectric-dam-brahmaputra-tibet-india-fears-flash-floods

[29] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zangmu_Dam#Downstream_concerns

[30] https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/water-level-of-brahmaputra-river-rises-at-warning-level-in-assam-121070600054_1.html

[31] https://www.oecd.org/india/India-Improving-Water-Security.pdf

[32] https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/22/science-shows-chinese-dams-devastating-mekong-river/

[33] https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/chinas-weaponisation-of-water/

[34] https://558353b6-da87-4596-a181-b1f20782dd18.filesusr.com/ugd/bae95b_0e0f87104dc8482b99ec91601d853122.pdf?index=true

[35] https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/22/science-shows-chinese-dams-devastating-mekong-river/

[36] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/30/who-blinked-in-china-india-military-standoff/

[37] https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/chinas-weaponisation-of-water/

[38] https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/chinas-weaponisation-of-water/

[39] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brahmaputra_floods

[40] https://www.opindia.com/2021/04/china-plans-super-dam-on-brahmaputra-river-three-gorges-tibet-and-india/#:~:text=China%20is%20planning%20to%20build,produces%20at%20300%20billion%20kilowatts.

[41] https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/chinas-hydropower-plan-on-the-brahmaputra/

[42] https://www.chinawaterrisk.org/opinions/chinas-water-sharing-treaties-reciprocity-in-practice/

[43] http://jalshakti-dowr.gov.in/international-cooperation/bilateral-cooperation-with-neighbouring-countries/india-china-cooperation

[44] http://jalshakti-dowr.gov.in/international-cooperation/bilateral-cooperation-with-neighbouring-countries/india-china-cooperation

[45] http://jalshakti-dowr.gov.in/international-cooperation/bilateral-cooperation-with-neighbouring-countries/india-china-cooperation

[46] https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/chinas-myanmar-dam-hypocrisy/

[47] https://www.voanews.com/a/laos-faces-debt-crisis-after-borrowing-billions-from-china-/6641633.html#:~:text=According%20to%20a%20World%20Bank,including%20the%20China%2DLaos%20railway.

[48] https://globalwaterforum.org/2022/06/02/soft-law-as-an-alternative-path-for-transboundary-water-cooperation-the-case-of-the-lancang-mekong-cooperation/

[49] https://www.independent.co.uk/climate-change/news/shanghai-bund-power-supply-china-b2150128.html

[50] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/18/china-deploys-cloud-seeding-planes-and-cuts-electricity-use-as-record-heatwave-takes-toll

[51] https://www.google.com/search?q=how+many+of+china%27s+rivers+are+polluted&oq=how+many+of+china%27s+rivers+are+pol&aqs=chrome.1.69i57j33i160l2j33i22i29i30.12820j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#:~:text=WATER%20POLLUTION%20IN,cat10%20%E2%80%BA%20sub66%20%E2%80%BA%20item391

[52] https://www.china-briefing.com/news/chinas-energy-storage-sector-policies-and-investment

-opportunities/#:~:text=China%20has%20set%20goals%20to,from%203.3GW%20in%202020.